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Summary
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the way in which accounting information
and corporate governance mechanisms relate to the extent to which insiders exploit opportunities
to trade in the stock of their own company.
The first essay, “CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading”, coauthored with Karin
Shields and Iain Clacher, examines insiders’ trading profitability female executives using a sample
of US firms between 2003 and 2011. The results suggest a significant decrease in firm-wide insider
trading profitability following switches from male-to-female CEOs and CFOs. These findings are
supported under different empirical specifications, including difference-in-differences, propensity
score matching and instrumental variable approach. This evidence is consistent with female
executives changing the ethical climate in their organization via a stronger “tone-at-the-top”
that limits insiders’ opportunistic trading.
In the second essay, “Insider Trading Restrictions and Earnings Management”, a joint work with
Beatriz Garcia Osma and Karin Shields, we propose and find that firms enjoy lower levels of
earnings management following the adoption of firm self-imposed insider trading restrictions. We
base our measure of insider trading restrictions on the extent to which transactions performed
by insiders take place in the allowed trading window, and we develop a methodology to identify
the quarter when each firm has adopted such restrictions. We find a significant negative relation
between our insider trading restrictions measure and earnings management levels, even after
controlling for previously documented determinants of earnings management.
The third essay, “Price Discovery for Connected Boards”, coauthored with Dimas Peña, focuses
on board connections as a potential channel through which flows of confidential information
to institutional investors affect the dynamics of information arrival into prices. We capture
the timing of private information flows by estimating the timeliness of price discovery over
quarterly earnings cycles. We develop a measure of board connectedness of listed companies and
institutional investors, and document an association between this measure of board connectedness
and the speed of price discovery. This evidence is consistent with firms having a more timely
price discovery the higher the number of common board members they share with institutional
investors.
***
Esta tesis consiste de tres ensayos que examinan la forma en que la información contable y los
mecanismos de gobierno corporativo se relacionan con las transacciones basadas en información
privilegiada.
El primer ensayo, “CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading”, trabajo que ha tenido
a Karin Shields y a Iain Clacher como coautores, examina la rentabilidad de las transacciones
basadas en información privilegiada cuando los gerentes son mujeres utilizando una muestra
de empresas estadounidenses entre 2003 y 2011. Los resultados sugieren una disminución
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significativa en la rentabilidad de las transacciones basadas en información privilegiada a nivel
de la empresa después de contratar a una gerenta ejecutiva. Estos hallazgos son consistentes
con diferentes especificaciones empíricas, incluyendo differencias-en-differencias, propensity score
matching y variables instrumentales. Esta evidencia es consistente con las ejecutivas cambiando
el clima ético en su organización a través de un fuerte tone-at-the-top que limita las transacciones
oportunistas dentro de la empresa.
En el segundo ensayo, “Insider Trading Restrictions and Earnings Management”, un trabajo
conjunto con Beatriz García Osma y Karin Shields, proponemos y encontramos que las empresas
disfrutan de niveles más bajos de manipulación de beneficios tras la adopción de restricciones de
uso de información privilegiada autoimpuestas por las empresas. Para identificar el trimestre
cuando cada empresa ha adoptado este tipo de restricciones, medimos la proporción de trasac-
ciones que ocurren en el periodo aprobado por la empresa respecto del total de transacciones
trimestrales. Encontramos una relación negativa entre las restricciones de transacciones basadas
en información privilegiada y el nivel de manipulación de los beneficios, incluso después de
controlar por los factores previamente documentados como determinantes de la manipulación de
los ingresos.
El tercer ensayo, “Price Discovery for Connected Boards”, trabajo que tiene como coautor a
Dimas Peña, se centra en conexiones entre las juntas directivas como un posible canal a través
del cual fluye la información confidencial a los inversores institucionales, afectando la dinámica
de la llegada información en los precios. Capturamos la llegada de los flujos de información
privada mediante la estimación del descubrimiento de precios durante los ciclos de ganancias
trimestrales. Desarrollamos una medida del nivel de conectividad entre juntas directivas de
las sociedades cotizadas y los inversores institucionales, y documentamos una asociación entre
la conexión entre los comités de los directores y la velocidad de formación de precios. Esta
evidencia es consistente con la idea que las empresas tienen una formación de precios más rápida
cuanto mayor sea el número de miembros del comités de los directores que comparten junta con
los inversores institucionales.
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Introduction
Insider trading has long received substantial attention both from regulators and from the
academic literature in accounting and finance. With the purpose to enhance investor protection,
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the amendments made to the Act via the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 require trades performed by insiders to be publicly disclosed to the
SEC within two business days from their execution. Moreover, firms seem to support regulators’
efforts by adopting self-imposed insider trading restrictions and in an attempt to reduce the
costs that insider trading carries to the organization: higher asymmetries of information, higher
bid-ask spreads, lower liquidity in the market for the company’s shares, to name a few.
Despite increased efforts to limit the ability of insiders’ to exploit their access to private
information at the expense of other investors, recent studies continue to document that insiders
gain abnormal returns from trading opportunistically. This dissertation revolves around insider
trading opportunities and the way that accounting information and internal corporate governance
mechanisms of the firm can affect the extent to which insiders are able to extract private benefits
from trading in the stocks of their own companies.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation largely consists of my job market paper. This essay analyzes the role
played by the gender of the CEO or CFO of the company as a corporate governance mechanism
restricting opportunistic behavior within the organization, as measured by firm-wide insider
trading. By using a set of specifications that aim to isolate the gender effect from alternative
explanations (including difference-in-differences, propensity score matching and instrumental
variable), we find that a company’s insiders are less likely to engage in opportunistic trading
when the CEO or CFO is a female. We also show that firms that switch back to a male executive
experience an increase in the profitability of insider trading. These results do not seem to be
a consequence of the adoption of insider trading restrictions, nor of changes in the financial
reporting environment of the company; rather, the mechanism driving our results seems to be
a change in the tone-at-the-top following the switch from a male to a female executive, which
translates into a more ethical climate and less opportunistic behavior like firm-level insider
trading within the firm.
Chapter 4 focuses on the relation between the financial reporting environment of the firm and
insider trading opportunities. Specifically, this essay examines whether insider trading represents
an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. Given that insider trading has been shown to
be more profitable in environments of high information asymmetries and low financial reporting
quality, it may provide incentives for managers to adversely influence the quality of their firms’
financial reporting practices. Our findings support this prediction. We document a decrease in the
level of earnings management, both accruals-based and real transaction management, following
the adoption of firm-level insider trading restrictions. By focusing on a self-imposed, internal
corporate governance mechanism of the firm, we show that such blackout periods effectively
limit managerial incentives to manipulate earnings. In this sense, we differ from previous studies
that have mostly focused on the consequences of mandatory regulation intended to improve
earnings management, and have documented an unwanted substitution effect between reduced
accruals management and increased real transaction management following such measures.
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In Chapter 5, we adopt a broader understanding of the insider trading concept, in line with
recent concerns of regulators. Specifically, during the last years, indirect forms of insider trading
have received attention from the specialized literature. This essay aims to identify and isolate
trading based on flows of private information facilitated by board interlocks between a listed
firm and an institutional investor by measuring the speed of price discovery around earnings
announcements for connected firms. We develop a measure of board connectedness that counts
the number of connections that a company has to institutional investors. In order to capture the
timeliness of price discovery, we compute a measure of how quickly information is impounded
into price around earnings announcements. We provide preliminary evidence that the higher
the number of connections to institutional investors a company has, the more timely the price
discovery over quarterly earnings circles is. This result is consistent with the idea that the more
institutional investors are connected to the board of the firm, the more pervasive their insider
trading becomes in influencing the speed of price discovery during earnings cycles.
4
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CEO and CFO Gender and
Firm-Wide Insider Trading
3.1 Introduction
Following the recent Volkswagen scandal on falsifying emission tests, Matthias Mueller, the
new chief executive, called upon the car maker’s executives to help change the one ingredient
that is believed to have caused the biggest challenge in the 78-year-old history of the company:
corporate ethical climate1.
The ethical climate of an organization is understood as the extent to which individuals within
the institution act with integrity - that is, not opportunistically. In the last years, financial
regulators have become aware of the fact that a sound ethical environment is critical not only
for a healthy organization, but for smoothly functioning markets in general. In this sense, the
Financial Stability Board issued in 2014 a framework for assessing risk culture in companies,
where it highlights that ethical weaknesses of individuals within institutions are at the core
of the global financial crisis. The report concludes by stressing the necessity to devote efforts
towards a better understanding of how can managers help disseminate an ethical climate and
shape non-opportunistic behavior within the company.
This study is the first to document that the ethical climate of the firm as reflected in the
profitability of insider trading performed by employees depends on a key attribute of the
company’s executives: their gender. Managerial personal characteristics have a significant effect
on corporate decision making. Perhaps more interestingly, personal attitudes and values of top
executives are reflected into a firm’s culture and disseminate throughout the firm, influencing
the behavior of other employees of the company. One such key characteristic is the gender of
the executive.
Gender differences have been extensively studied in fields such as psychology, but little is known
about the effects of these behavioral differences on the extent of opportunistic behavior within
the firm. Women tend to be more ethical in business across a range of practices, including being
more critical of ethical issues and less loyal to the company in questionable situations (Ford and
Richardson (1994); Craft (2013)). Cesarini et al. (2010) finds that the only significant difference
between men and women’s choice of pension funds is that women are more prone to opt for
funds that invest in environmental-friendly companies or avoid investment in tobacco, alcohol,
and the arms industry.
Top executives are the starting point for establishing the core values that build the ethical climate
of their firms - a mechanism known as the “tone-at-the-top”. Moreover, their own actions and
1Volkswagen’s New CEO Says Car Maker Must Change Its Corporate Culture. September 28, 2015, The Wall
Street Journal. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagens-new-ceo-says-car-maker-must-change-
its-corporate-culture-1443464516?alg=y
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behaviors “will be emulated by the rest of the institution”, as the Financial Stability Board puts
it. Empirical findings support that employees’ behavior is influenced by their leaders’ behavior
(Jong and Hartog (2007); Starke (2012)). These findings, together with the gender behavioral
differences previously mentioned, suggest that the gender of the executive may translate into a
different ethical climate that disseminates throughout the organization and encourages different
types of individual behavior.
We study the effect of executives’ gender on the opportunistic behavior of employees in the
organization, measured by firm-level insider trading profitability. Insider trading profits are
related to weak internal control over financial reporting and a weak “tone-at-the-top” (Skaife
et al. (2013)). We consider the insider trading behavior of the employees in an organization
as a representation of the strength of the tone-at-the-top within the company: specifically,
we interpret the presence of profitable insider trading within a firm as a symptom for weak
“tone-at-the-top”. Given the documented concern of women with ethical issues and integrity, we
propose that when women are appointed to key positions such as CEO or CFO, they change the
“tone-at-the-top” of their firm to discourage opportunistic behavior like insider trading.
Consistent with our prediction, we find that insider trading profitability decreases in the period
following a switch from a male to a female executive. Using a difference-in-differences approach,
we find that following an executive turnover, firms that switch from male-to-female executives
experience lower levels of insider trading profitability in the period after the switch than firms
that change from male-to-male executives.
We conduct additional tests to distinguish the “tone-at-the-top” effect from alternative explana-
tions. First, we examine whether our result is explained by a change in the financial reporting
quality following the appointment of a new executive. Our proxy for financial reporting quality
is the level of earnings management as measured by the Lagged Jones model, where higher
financial reporting quality is assumed to result in lower levels of discretionary accruals. As a
first step we estimate the effect of male-to-female executive switches on the level of discretionary
accruals and find no significant result. As a second step, we include the earnings management
proxy as a control in the estimation of insider trading profitability and find that the negative
association between a switch to a female executive and insider trading profitability remains.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the effect of gender on insider trading profitability
is not explained by an improvement in financial reporting quality following a male-to-female
executive switch.
Second, we examine whether our findings are explained by the new executive implementing
firm-wide insider trading restrictions. The results of this analysis show that the decrease in
profitability after hiring a female executive is not explained by the firm imposing blackout
periods. The evidence from these tests supports the interpretation that female executives change
the tone-at-the-top and the ethical culture of the company, which translates into less firm-wide
opportunistic insider trading.
We acknowledge that causal inferences may be challenged by the fact that female executives may
not be randomly assigned to firms. While the difference-in-difference approach likely mitigates
potential endogeneity issues by comparing insider trading behavior before and after switches
from a male to a female executive with a control sample of male-to-male switches, we conduct
additional tests to ensure the reliability of our result. First, we use a propensity score matching
framework and match firms by characteristics that make them likely to hire a female executive.
Estimations based on the resulting matched control sample support our main finding.
Second, we develop an instrumental variable approach to correct for potential endogeneity issues.
The instrument we use is an index of gender equality by states (we employ the more recent
index values calculated in Di Noia (2002), built based on the gender equality index developed
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by Sugarman and Straus (1988)). This measure is a good candidate for an instrument: we
expect that the likelihood of a firm to have a female executive is higher in states that have
higher levels of gender equality (Huang and Kisgen (2013)), and there is no obvious reason why
the index would explain the prevalence of insider trading in firms. We use a two-stage least
square instrumental variable setting. Both the coefficient of the gender equality index from
the first stage and the instrumented variable in the second stage of the estimation are highly
significant.
Third, in order to avoid drawing inferences about our prediction in the case when other
unobservable changes within the company could coincide with the decision to hire a female
executive, we study the trading patterns in firms that switch back to a male executive. Out of
the 86 firms that change their CEO or CFO from a male to a female, 24 firms switch back to a
male executive over our sample period. We find a reversal in the trading profitability for this
subsample: insiders’ profits are significantly higher in the period following the change back to a
male executive. Taken together, these findings support our prediction that where women are
appointed to key positions such as the CEO and CFO, there is a change in insiders’ opportunistic
behavior.
Our paper makes contributions to several strands of literature. Regulators state that the ethical
climate of a company influences the extent to which individuals behave with integrity, and
encourage efforts to understand the mechanism facilitating this effect within organizations. The
extent of opportunism among insiders depends on individuals’ values, norms and attitudes
that are difficult to measure empirically. We take a step towards this ambitious objective by
analyzing how executives’ gender differences influences firm-wide insider trading profitability.
Our findings can be interpreted as a mapping of the way executives influence the extent of ethical
behavior that then disseminates throughout the company, influencing employees’ opportunistic
behavior. Our results suggest that a sound ethical climate plays a critical role in correcting the
opportunistic behaviors of individuals within the organization as measured by firm-wide insider
trading.
Further, we add to the relatively recent body of research analyzing the influence of managers’
personal attributes (beyond the effect of firm characteristics) on the corporate environment
of the firm. Gender has been found to be a relevant decision making factor in studies from
fields like psychology, but evidence about its effect in corporate decision making is relatively
scarce and inconsistent. In this sense, our results add to the discussion on another issue of great
concern for regulators in many countries: mandatory quotas for female representations within
the board of directors
Finally, we identify a channel that mitigates insiders’ incentives to extract profits at the expense
of shareholders. Regulators and firms themselves make efforts to restrict insider trading through
internal trading policies (Bettis et al. (2000); Roulstone (2003)) or other corporate governance
mechanisms (Jagolinzer et al. (2011)). We contribute to this growing body of work by showing
that the presence of women in key positions limits the scope for rent extraction from shareholders
via insider trading.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and predictions
motivating our tests. Section 3 outlines our sample and chosen insider trading measures. Section
4 presents our research design. Section 5 presents our empirical results and section 6 summarizes
and concludes.
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3.2 Background and predictions
3.2.1 The tone-at-the-top and gender behavioral differences
Prior studies suggest ethical decision making is an influential factor underlying opportunistic
behavior such as insider trading (Skaife et al. (2013)). We consider that a manager exerts a
strong “tone-at-the-top” if they promote ethical behavior within the company. This would
encompass acting with integrity, complying with policies and procedures, and not taking actions
in their own self interest. A relatively poor “tone-at-the-top” may manifest itself in less
monitoring of undesirable behaviors within the firm, such as insider trading. Below we provide
an excerpt showing policymakers’ emphasis on the role that top executives play in establishing
the corporate culture in their company and an example of an auditor’s assessment2 of a firm’s
weak “tone-at-the-top”:
The board and senior management, consistently within their specific roles and responsibilities,
promote through behaviours, actions and words, a risk culture that expects integrity. [...] Senior
management is subject to the same expectations for integrity [...] as all other employees. [...]
An environment that promotes integrity should be created across the institution as a whole.
(Financial Stability Board (2014))
Senior management did not establish and maintain a proper tone as to internal control over
financial reporting. Specifically, senior management did not emphasize, through consistent
communication, the importance of internal control over financial reporting and adherence to the
code of business conduct and ethics.
(Bearingpoint Inc., Form 10-K, 1/31/2006)
We predict that a weak “tone-at-the-top” translates into a weak ethical climate, and vice-versa.
Our understanding of ethical climate is, consistent with Guiso et al. (2015) and Bushman et al.
(2015), as the system of shared values that define [][]appropriate attitudes and behaviors for
organizational members (O’Reilly and Chatman (1996)). We also follow Hodgson (1996) in
assuming that the ethical climate of the firm is able to influence the behavior of individuals and
induce them to internalize a set of norms, as opposed to the view of Kreps (1990) where culture
is simply seen as the reputation that an organization has built over time.
A very recent strand of literature examines the role played by executives in the way that norms
disseminate within their organization. For example, Bushman et al. (2015) finds that CEOs drive
the corporate culture in banks and documents that employees in banks with materialistic CEOs
(as evidenced by managers’ ownership of luxury goods) have a higher likelihood to exploit insider
trading opportunities relative to executives at banks with frugal CEOs. Materialistic executives
promote a loose control environment with high probabilities of other insiders perpetrading fraud
during their tenure (Davidson et al. (2015)). Finally, purchases performed by non-CEOs are
2SOX 404 requires auditors to assess managerial integrity if the actions of management promote an unethical
work environment. Excerpt from Skaife et al. (2013).
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more profitable in firms run by materialistic managers than in firms run by frugal managers
(Davidson et al. (2014)).
We propose that the ethical climate promoted and disseminated throughout the organization
differs with the gender of the executives. Men and women differ in their decision making.
Firms with female executives make different acquisition decisions compared to firms with male
executives, and investors react more favorably to corporate decisions made by companies with
female CEOs and CFOs (Huang and Kisgen (2013)). A recent article in Financial Times suggests
that hedge funds with female executives differ in their portfolios and performance from funds
managed by men.3 Recent studies have also identified differences in the trading patterns of male
and female insiders: survey evidence shows that more men than women state that they would
be likely to engage in unethical trading (Terpstra et al. (1993)), which may explain the finding
that women insiders earn significantly lower returns on their trades than men (Bharath et al.
(2009); Hillier et al. (2014)).
These results are in line with results from the business ethics literature suggesting that women
tend to be more ethical in business across a range of practices, including being more critical of
ethical issues, less loyal to the company in questionable situations, and show a greater concern for
environmental issues and human wellbeing (Ford and Richardson (1994); Craft (2013)). Further,
in a study of the impact of gender variation in pension investment options, Cesarini et al. (2010)
finds that the only significant difference between men and women’s financial decisions is that
women are more prone to opt for “ethical” funds4. These empirical findings suggest that the
executive’s gender may affect the way in which corporate culture disseminates throughout the
organization, influencing employees’ opportunistic behavior.
The “tone-at-the-top” significantly improves with the presence of females in the board of directors.
For example, Abbott et al. (2012) finds that the presence of at least one female board member is
associated with a decline in the number of financial restatements facilitated by an improvement
in the “tone-at-the-top”. Increased board gender diversity is associated with greater transparency
for shareholders through better accounting practices (Krishnan and Parsons (2008); Barua et al.
(2010); Habib and Hossain (2013); Francis et al. (2015); Abbott et al. (2012)).5 Gender-diverse
boards allocate more efforts to oversight and monitoring by promoting better board attendance
and demanding greater accountability from managers for poor performance, and female directors
are more likely to take up monitoring positions on audit and corporate governance committees
(Adams and Ferreira (2009)). Moreover, Gul et al. (2011) shows that board diversity improves
stock price informativeness via better managerial monitoring. Companies with more women in
senior management positions are moreprofitable and enjoy higher returns over a longer time
period (Krishnan and Parsons (2008)).
Top management behavior exerts a significant influence on their employees’ behavior (Jong and
Hartog (2007); Starke (2012)). Consistent with this idea, Skaife et al. (2013) finds a link between
a weak “tone-at-the-top” and insider trading profitability within the firm.
In light of these empirical findings, we propose that firms with female executives have a different
ethical climate than firms with male executives. Given the documented higher concerns regarding
ethical issues among women than men in business, we expect that top female executives set a
stronger “tone-at-the-top” that translates into a sound ethical corporate environment. We expect
that these values “leak” throughout the organization and discourage opportunistic behavior
3Put women at the top and lift hedge funds higher, Financial Times, September 17, 2015.
4The authors define an “ethical” fund as one that either uses this word in its title or one with a self-described
investment strategy favoring environmental-friendly companies or avoiding investment in tobacco, alcohol, and
the arms industry.
5For a recent review of the effect of gender differences on the level of ethics in business, see Craft (2013).
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among employees. Specifically, we predict that firm-wide insider trading profitability decreases
following the appointment of a female CEO or CFO.
Given the relatively small representation of women in top positions in our sample, our prediction
that the trades of insiders in firms with female executives earn lower profits may be puzzling.
There are several potential explanations for the low number of women in top positions (Huang
and Kisgen (2013)). It may be that women and men perform better across different dimensions
of shareholder value creation; that is, finding that are more prone to monitor and change the
opportunistic behavior of the employees does not challenge the idea that male executives make
better decisions for the firm along other shareholder value creation dimensions.
It may also be that female executives may be discriminated against - that is, they may not
be hired by discriminating firms, despite the higher cost of discrimination (Becker (1971)).
Those women who are able to overcome discriminatory preferences and be hired therefore
perform better. Regardless of which of these theories explains the low representations of women
Regardless of which of these theories explains the low representation of women and the different
“tone-at-the-top” they promote, we believe that examining whether they exert a distinct effect
compared to male executives on firm-wide opportunistic behavior is an issue of great interest for
policymakers, for the corporate environment and for academic research likewise.
3.2.2 Insider trading as rent extraction from shareholders
The trading behavior of insiders has received substantial attention both from regulators and
from academic literature in accounting and finance. Extant studies have consistently found
that insiders are better informed and earn abnormal returns (Rozeff and Zaman (1988); Seyhun
(1988)) and therefore have the potential to undertake actions that are detrimental to shareholders
and investors. Specifically, previous studies have identified two channels through which insider
trading crowds out outside investors. First, insider trading limits the gains from stock research
and makes it less profitable for outside investors (Fernandes and Ferreira (2009)). Second, insider
trading opportunities motivate insiders to disclose low-quality information to outsiders in order
to increase their own informational advantage and their trading profits, despite the higher cost of
capital and lower stock prices for the firm implied by their trading behavior (Zhang and Zhang
(2012)).
Regulators in many countries have imposed restrictions on insider trading in order to decrease
the effect of the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders. The Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, and the amendments made to the Act via the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act
of 2002, require insiders’ trades to be publicly disclosed via the filing of Form 4 to the SEC within
two business days.6 Firms seem to support regulators’ efforts and often adopt self-imposed
insider trading restrictions7 (Bettis et al. (2000); Jagolinzer et al. (2011)). These efforts have
not eliminated insiders’ use of their informational advantage, as trades based on information
already impounded in share prices should lead to the average profitability being zero. Research
continuously documents that insider trades gain positive risk-adjusted returns over the 180 days
following the transaction (Seyhun (1986); Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Jagolinzer et al. (2011)),
suggesting that insiders use their informational advantage by trading on private information.
6Insiders are under the Act defined as directors, officers, and principal stock- holders with a stake of 10 percent
or more. Prior to SOX, the requirement to disclose trades by insiders was by the end of the month in which
the trading occurred (Brochet (2010)).
7Firm-imposed insider trading restrictions are justified by the costs it carries to the organization by increasing
asymmetries of information, which leads to higher bid-ask spreads, lower liquidity in the market for the
company’s shares, and a higher discount rate (Bettis et al. (2000)).
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Requirements regarding gender quotas on board of directors are an issue of increasing interest for
regulators worldwide.8 However, the mixed results of studies examining the effect of mandatory
quotas on corporate decisions may explain the heterogeneity in countries regulation regarding
gender quotas. For example, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) documents a negative relation between
firm value and the increase in the percentage of women due to gender quotas in Norway. With
these discussions underway, it is important to investigate what impact such requirements may
have on corporate policies. Our setting is based on a non-quota environment where increases in
female executive directors happen voluntarily. This should reduce any potential bias introduced
by situations where there are quotas and the selection of women and men may be based on
different merits.
3.3 Sample and measurement choice
In order to explore the gender effect on insider trading behavior, we compare the trading behavior
of insiders in a firm before and after a switch to a female CEO or CFO. We use the annual
cumulated trading profitability of all insiders within the firm as a measure of insider trading.
3.3.1 Sample data
The accounting information used in this study is obtained from Compustat yearly database. We
use open-market transactions between 2003-2011 from Thomson Financial Insider Filings and
additionally employ information for daily share prices and returns from Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). Our choice sample period is post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002,
which imposed stricter disclosure requirements for insider trades. We compile our executive
gender data from ExecuComp and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). As in Huang and
Kisgen (2013), we focus both on CEO and CFO transitions in order to increase the sample size,
as it would otherwise be too small to allow for a meaningful analysis. Subsequent tests are
based, unless otherwise specified, on a final sample of 86 male-to-female transitions and 1276
male-to-male transitions over the period 2003-2011.
3.3.2 Insider trading measures
Our measure of insider trading is supported by the notion that insider trades do not necessarily
reflect private information. Only trades based on private information earn profits in an efficient
market. In order to distinguish between informed trades and trades made in order to meet insiders’
liquidity needs, we follow Jagolinzer et al. (2011) and compute insider trading profitability. For
every trading day, we net the transactions of all insiders at the firm in terms of the number
of traded shares to arrive at the daily firm-wide net transaction and identify whether this is a
purchase or a sale. We estimate the following four-factor Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) model over the 180 days following each transaction:
8Legal quotas for female directors are already being enforced in Norway, Belgium, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain. France will enforce a 40% quota in 2016 and, in Germany, there will be a vote on a draft law
introducing a requirement for at lest 30% women on companies’ boards from 2016 (Nienaber, 2014).
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Ri −Rf = α+ β1(Rm −Rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML+ β4UMD + ε (3.1)
where Ri is firm’s i daily return, Rf is the daily risk-free interest rate, Rm is the CRSP value-
weighted market return, and SMB, HML and UMD are the Size, Book-to-Market and Momentum
factors from the four-factor Fama & French (1997) and Carhart (1997) model. The proxy for
insider trading obtained from the above model, TradingProfit, is given by the average daily
risk-adjusted returns as measured by the intercept α. A positive α for insider purchases would
indicate that trades earn an average positive return over the following 180 days, i.e. are profitable.
Conversely sales are profitable in instances of a negative α.9
The insider trading measure we use for our tests, Annual average trading profitability, is given
by the firm-wide mean trade day profitability for the year.
3.3.3 Identifying CEO/CFO switches
For identifying male to female CEO and CFO switches, we collect the name, gender, and rank of
the executive for all firms from ExecuComp and ISS. For obtaining our main sample, we exclude
financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification between 6000 and 6999) and impose the
condition that the predecessor executive is a male (that is, our treatment sample solely consists
of male-to-female CEO and CFO turnover and our control sample consists of male-to-male CEO
and CFO turnover). We require that any new executive holds that position for a minimum of
two consecutive years transition year included), to insure enough time for a managerial effect
within the firm. We also require that before any switch there is as a minimum one year of
financial data available. This matching procedure identifies 86 cases of male-to-female CEO and
CFO turnover and 1276 cases of male-to-male executive turnover.
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 and 3.2 present summary statistics. Table 3.1, Panel A indicates a more homogenous
preference between hiring male and female executives in the latest years, with a slight preference
for female executives: in the first 3 years of our sample 25,58% of the total changes to female
executives and almost 33% of the switches to male executives took place, while a higher 28%
of the switches to female executives and a significantly lower 26,65% of the switches to men
executives are concentrated in the last 3 years of the sample. Panel B presents the distribution
of executive switches by industry. Similar to Huang and Kisgen (2013), we find that women
are more highly represented in consumer products firms, followed by companies in the health,
manufacture, and utilities industries.
[Insert Table 3.1 about here]
9Appendix B presents an illustrative example of the steps taken in order to compute TradingProfit (e.g., α from
the four-factor model above).
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Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the main variables employed for our main tests for all
the years of data before and after an executive transition from a male to either a male or a female
CEO or CFO. For either type of switch, a decrease in the median and mean insider trading
profitability can be observed after the executive switch. Interestingly, firms that choose to hire a
female executive record more profitable trades by insiders in the years preceding the executive
transition than their male-to-male counterparts, but reach to similar insider trading profitability
values as the male-to-male firms in the years after the switch. These values are consistent with a
relatively stronger “tone-at-the-top” of female executives compared to male executives, but they
suggest that our research design must take into account the fact that firms that choose to hire
female or male executives may differ in their decision because they are different across other
dimensions as well. In the following section we present the methods we employ to control for
this possibility.
[Insert Table 3.2 about here]
3.4 Research design
In order to study the effect of female executives on insider trading behavior at firm level we take
the following steps.
We start by studying the effect of the CEO or CFO gender on the daily profitability of insider
trading. However, female executives may not be randomly assigned to firms. While the gender of
an executive could be considered random, boards could discriminate based on gender, or women
may self-select into certain types of firms (Huang and Kisgen (2013)). If firms discriminate
based on gender, then our results could be driven by the firm characteristics that are associated
with discriminatory behavior. In order to correct for such potential endogeneity issues, we
additionally use a difference-in-difference, a propensity score matching and an instrumental
variable framework.
Moreover, in order to investigate whether our inferences are drawn by unobservable characteristics
of firms that hire women rather than by the gender of the executive, we examine the effect of
gender on the measure of insider trading profitability on a subsample of firms that choose to
hire back a man as a CEO or CFO after the male-to-female switch. Finally, the last step of our
analysis aims to identify the channel through which the analyzed effect takes place.
3.4.1 Average daily insider trading profitability and executive gender
Our first test investigates the average daily trade profitability of firms with a female CEO or CFO
as compared to that of firms with a male CEO or CFO. For this test we use the entire sample of
executives switches (i.e., male-to-male, male-to-female, female-to-female and female-to-male).
We exclude financial firms and require that any new executive holds that position for a minimum
of two consecutive years (transition year included), and that before any switch there is minimum
one year of financial data available. We keep three years before and after each executive switch,
excluding the transition year. TradingProfit is the average daily risk-adjusted return estimated
over the 180 days following each trading day (i.e., α stored from the four-factor Fama-French and
Carhart model), as outlined in section 3.2 and Appendix B. This measure of insider trading is
regressed on the gender of both the CEO and CFO in our combined sample, as well as separately.
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We control for the market value, book to market ratio and return on assets. Our coefficient of
interest is β1, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
TradingProfiti,t = α+ β1Exec_Femalei,t + β2Controlsi,t + εi,t (3.2)
Female executives may not be randomly assigned to firms. While the gender of an executive
could be considered random, boards could discriminate based on gender, or women may self-
select into certain types of firms (Huang and Kisgen (2013)). If firms discriminate based on
gender, then our results could be driven by the firm characteristics that are associated with
discriminatory behavior. In order to correct for this potential endogeneity issues, we additionally
use a difference-in-difference and a propensity score matching framework.
3.4.2 Insider trading and male to female CEO/CFO switches
We test the effect of male-to-female CEO/CFO turnover using three different approaches. Each
of them is described into detail below.
3.4.2.1 Insider trading profitability and male-to-female switches
First, we examine how insiders’ trading behavior changes in the period following a male-to-female
CEO/CFO turnover. For this analysis we use only the male-to-female firm-years. The empirical
model is as follows:
Profitabilityi,t+1 = µ+ β1Posti,t+1 + β2Controlsi,t + γi + τt + εi,t (3.3)
where Profitabilityi,t+1 is our measure for insider trading measured at the end of year t+1, γi
are industry fixed effects, τt are time fixed effects and the other variables are as described in
Appendix A. Our coefficient of interest is β1, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
3.4.2.2 Difference-in-difference approach
In order to remove the effect of other potential time series changes within the firm contem-
poraneous to the CEO or CFO turnovers, similar to Francis et al. (2015) and Huang and
Kisgen (2013), we employ a difference-in-differences approach. This framework allows us to
compare insider trading behavior before and after male-to-female CEO or CFO turnover with a
control sample of male-to-male CEO or CFO turnover. Compared to a simple panel data with
fixed effects approach, the difference-in-difference has a series of benefits (Huang and Kisgen
(2013)). First, to ensure that the executive has sufficient time to make an impact on corporate
policy, he or she is required to be in the position for a minimum period of two years. Second,
we condition all tests on the occurrence of any type of CEO or CFO turnover. Specifically,
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the controls for our female-to-male CEO or CFO turnover firms are a sample of male-to-male
CEO or CFO turnover firms. Third, the difference-in-differences approach allows us to control
for time-invariant unobservable firm effects by comparing the insider trading behavior after a
male-to-female CEO/CFO turnover with that before the switch.
We keep three years before and after each executive switch, excluding the transition year. As
suggested in Huang and Kisgen (2013), we require minimum two years of data before the
executive turnover event. Our main regression is the following:
Profitabilityi,t+1 = µ+β1Posti,t+1+β2Posti,t+1∗Femalei+β3Controlsi,t+νi+τt+εi,t (3.4)
where Profitabilityi,t+1 is our measure for insider trading measured at the end of year t+1, νi
are firm fixed effects, τt are time fixed effects and the rest of the variables are as described in
Appendix A. Our coefficient of interest is β2, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
3.4.2.3 Propensity score matching approach
The propensity score matching approach uses a matched-pair research design that matches a
treatment firm with a control firm that is similar across a series of relevant variables. This
setting allows us to compare changes in insider trading behavior between firms that experience
a male-to-female CEO or CFO turnover event and firms that are similar to the treated firms
across a set of relevant observable characteristics, but encounter a male-to-male CEO or CFO
turnover event instead.
We estimate a probit propensity-score model, which is the probability that an executive is a
female (i.e., the treatment) conditional on observable features of the firm’s environment. We
follow Huang and Kisgen (2013) and Francis et al. (2015) in choosing the variables that predict
the likelihood of having a female CEO or CFO, namely, profitability, size, market-to-book (all
of which are included with a one-year lag), year and industry, and a CEO indicator variable.
The fitted values of the probit model represent the propensity scores. We select the match for a
treatment firm as a firm that encounters a male-to-male CEO or CFO turnover event in the
same year, and is the closest to the treatment firm in terms of propensity scores; the set of
obtained matched are referred to as the propensity score matching control group10. We then
estimate the following regression on the matched sample to examine the gender differences in
insider trading:
Profitabilityi,t+1 = µ+ β1Femalei + β2Controlsi,t + νi + τt + εi,t (3.5)
Our coefficient of interest is β1, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
10More details of the propensity score matching methodology are provided in Appendix B.
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3.4.3 Instrumental variable approach
In order to rule out any alternate explanation of other unobserved changes in a firm’s preference
for executives’ gender, we also use an instrumental variable approach. The instrument we use is
a gender equality index developed by Sugarman and Straus (1988) that measures the extent to
which a U.S. state is friendly to gender equality. We use the more recent values of the index
calculated in a subsequent study by Di Noia (2002). We expect that the higher the level of
gender status equality is in a state, the higher the likelihood for a firm situated in that state to
hire a female executive (Huang and Kisgen (2013)). Additionally, since there are no obvious
reasons why this index would explain insider trading profitability, it is a good candidate for an
instrument.
Based on its headquarters location, we identify the corresponding value of the gender equality
index for each firm in the entire sample of executives switches (i.e., male-to-male, male-to-female,
female-to-female and female-to-male). As before, we exclude financial firms and require that
any new executive holds that position for a minimum of two consecutive years (transition year
included), and that before any switch there is minimum one year of financial data available. We
keep three years before and after each executive switch, excluding the transition year.
We then estimate the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model:
(I) : Femalei = ϕ+ ρGenderEqIndexi + θControlsi,t + τt + ξ1,i,t
(II) : Profitabilityi,t = µ+ βInstrumentedFemalei +i,t +τt + ξ2,i,t
(3.6)
where Profitabilityi,t is our measure for insider trading measured at the end of year t, Femalei is
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm switches to a female executive and 0 otherwise, and
InstrumentedFemalei is the fitted value of the female indicator from the first-stage regression.
Our coefficient of interest is β, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
3.4.4 Insider trading profitability in reversal firms
One final alternative explanation for our result is that it is caused by unobservable changes in
corporate governance within the firm that coincide with the switch to a female executive. We
conjecture that changes in corporate governance views of the firm are relatively infrequent over
a 9-years long sample. We study the impact of executive gender on that subsample of the 86
male-to-female firms that, after hiring a female executive, switch back to a male executive. We
call these firms reversal firms. Finding that insider trading profitability increases following a
switch back to a male CEO or CFO would support the prediction that the effect studied in this
paper is consistent with gender differences in the “tone-at-the-top” that reflect into insiders’
trading incentives.
We estimate the following regression on the subsample of reversal firms:
Profitabilityi,t+1 = µ+ β1Posti,t+1 + β2Controlsi,t + τt + εi,t (3.7)
Our coefficient of interest is β1, and we predict that it is negative and significant.
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3.4.5 Alternative channels
After examining the effect of the gender of the executive on insider trading profitability, we
aim to identify the mechanism through which this effect takes place. We conjecture that there
will be more profitable insider trading in firms where the manager exerts a relatively poorer
“tone-at-the-top”, manifested into less opportunistic behaviors within the firm.
In this section, we study whether the effect of the executives’ gender on insider trading comes as
a consequence of differences in the “tone-at-the-top” exerted by male and female executives, or as
a consequence of male and female executives implementing within the firm distinct mechanisms
that affect insiders’ incentives to trade.
The first channel we analyze is financial reporting quality. Previous studies have found that
insider trading yields higher returns in firms with more information asymmetries and lower
reporting quality (Aboody et al. (2005); Frankel and Li (2004); Huddart and Ke (2007)).
Therefore, we examine whether the effect we study is a consequence of a change in the financial
reporting quality of the firm following a male-to-female CEO or CFO switch, that translates
into lower profits that can be extracted from insider trading. Our proxy for financial reporting
quality is earnings management as measured by the Lagged Jones model.
The second channel we study is the extent to which the firm itself imposes restrictions on insider
trading. A large number of firms choose to impose blackout periods, when trades by insiders
are not permitted before important events for the firm (for example, earnings announcements).
Roulstone (2003) finds that blackout periods are imposed in the last two thirds of the period
between two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. Since the extent to which firms
restrict insider trading internally is not directly observable, we follow Roulstone (2003) in using
the observable effect of timing policies to build a measure for insider trading restrictions. Bettis
et al. (2000) shows that trading during restricted periods is approximately three times less likely
than during allowed trading windows. Therefore, the higher the percentage of trades executed
in the short period of allowed trading window (i.e., on average during the last 30 days after
the earnings announcements), the more restricted insider trading is considered to be within the
firm11. We examine whether female executives adopt such restrictions within the firm after being
hired, and whether this measure reflects itself into less profitable transactions by insiders.
As in Gul et al. (2011), we examine how each of these channels affects the relation between gender
executive and insider trading in two stages. First, we study the effect of female executives on the
discretionary accruals and on the insider trading restriction measure, respectively. Second, we
examine the change in insider trading profitability following a male-to-female executive switch in
a research setting where we include an additional control for each channel separately. Specifically,
we estimate the following regressions on the sample of male-to-female executive switches:
Xi,t = µ+ β1Posti,t+1 + β2Controlsi,t + γi + τt + εi,t (3.8)
Profitabilityi,t+1 = µ+ β1Posti,t+1 + β2Controlsi,t + β3Xi,t + γi + τt + εi,t (3.9)
where Xi,t is either the measure of discretionary accruals or of insider trading restrictions and
the other variables are as previously described. Together, these tests are insightful as to the
mechanism through which executive gender affects insider trading.
11Details about the computation of the insider trading restriction proxy are presented in Appendix D.
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3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Insider trading and female executives
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
Table 3.3 reports the average parameters for the transaction-day specific regressions. If trading
is based on private information we expect profitability to be positive and significant. Consistent
with this, we find that for net purchase trades and net sales trades combined, the profitability of
trades is positive and significant. However, in contrast to prior research (Lakonishok and Lee
(2001); Jagolinzer et al. (2011)), we find that these results are driven by net sales transactions
and that net purchase transactions incur a significant negative risk-adjusted profitability.
The results for the estimation of Eq. (3.2) are presented in Table 3.4. If the gender of the CEO
and CFO matters for firm wide insider trading profitability, we would expect to see a significant
coefficient for the variable Exec_Female. Consistent with the proposition that women in key
positions such as CEO and CFO impose more ethical trading behavior within their firm, we
document a significant negative coefficient for Exec_Female on the combined CEO and CFO
sample; however, results seem to be driven by the CEO sample. Insider trades are significantly
less profitable when there is a woman CEO or CFO, and the results are robust to the inclusion
of control variables.
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
3.5.2 Insider trading profitability and male-to-female CEO/CFO turnover
Table 3.5 presents the results on the effect of male-to-female CEO/CFO turnover on Annual
Average Trading Profitability. In Column 1, we include Post as the only independent variable, in
Column 2 we add the control variables, and in Column 3 we include industry and year effects.
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
The coefficient of Post is negative across all specifications, suggesting that, on average, the
profitability of trades made by insiders decreases in the period following a male-to-female
CEO/CFO turnover. The significance of the coefficient is consistent across all specifications.
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3.5.3 Difference in difference analysis
The results for the regression in Eq. (3.3) are presented in Table 3.6, Panel A. The dependent
variable is the Annual Average Trading Profitability measure. In the first column we report
results of tests with year and industry fixed effects, while in the second column industry fixed
effects are replaced by firm fixed effects.
[Insert Table 3.6 about here]
Consistent with our prediction, the negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term
Female x Post in Column 2 suggests that under female executives, the profitability of insiders
decreases by 0.12 percentage points.
3.5.4 Propensity score matched samples
Panel B in Table 3.6 reports the results using propensity score matching. The negative and sig-
nificant coefficient of Female suggests that under female executives, insiders’ trading profitability
decreases.
3.5.5 Instrumental variable approach
Column 1 of Table 3.7, Panel A presents the results from the first-stage ordinary least squares
regressions of the instrumental variable estimation. The coefficient of the gender equality index
in this first-stage is highly significant, suggesting a strong relation between the likelihood of a
firm appointing a female executive and the extent to which a state is friendly toward gender
equality. The F-statistic from the first-stage estimation is 13.92, higher than the rule of thumb
threshold of 10 of Stock and Yogo (2005) for strong instruments.
[Insert Table 3.7 about here]
The second column reports the results of the second-stage OLS estimation. The negative and
significant coefficient of the instrumented variable supports our main prediction that firms with
female executives have lower levels of insider trading profitability.
3.5.6 Reversal firms
Out of the 86 firms that switch from a male to a female executive, 24 firms switch back to a
male throughout our sample period. Results from estimating Eq. (3.7) are presented in Table
3.7, Panel B. Column 2 differs from column 1 in that it includes a set of controls.
Compared to the case of firms that change from a male to a female executive, firms that switch
back to male record a reversal in the effect of executive gender on insider trading profitability,
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as captured by the significantly positive coefficient of Post. This result is consistent with the
idea that the gender of the executives influences the documented change in the trading behavior
of insiders following an executive switch.
3.5.7 Alternative channels
Table 3.8 presents the results regarding how the documented relation between insider trading
profitability and executive gender may be explained by two potential alternative channels:
financial reporting quality (results presented in the first two columns of the table) and insider
trading restrictions (results presented in columns 3 and 4).
[Insert Table 3.8 about here]
Columns 1 and 3 present the results of estimating the effect of female executives on the
discretionary accruals and on the insider trading restriction measure, respectively. Columns 2
and 4 present results of how the change in insider trading profitability following a male-to-female
executive switch in a research setting where we include an additional control for each channel
separately. The presence of female executives does not seem to significantly affect neither
the level of discretionary accruals nor the insider trading restrictions; more importantly, even
after controlling for the effect of financial reporting quality and insider trading restrictions,
the profitability of insiders’ trades decreases following a switch to a female executive. The
implication of these findings is that the gender of the executives affects insiders’ trading behavior
not by improving the financial reporting quality or imposing higher trading restrictions, but by
exerting a relatively stronger tone-at-the-top.
3.6 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we document that CEOs’ and CFOs’ gender affects the trading behavior of insiders.
Specifically, we examine whether the profitability of firm wide insider trading changes with the
appointment of a female CEO or a female CFO. We find compelling evidence that firm-wide
insider trading profitability decreases where a firm appoints a female CEO or CFO. This result
is consistent with prior evidence that women set a relatively stronger tone-at-the-top than men,
and that the ethical tone set at the top disseminates throughout the firm, mitigating insiders’
incentives to trade opportunistically.
We perform a series of additional tests to rule out alternative explanations that are consistent
with our findings, and the evidence is suggestive of a tone-at-the-top effect. Regardless of the
mechanism driving the results, the empirical findings document key differences between the
opportunistic behavior of insiders in firms with male and female executives. These results
are relevant for regulators in the context of the discussions regarding mandatory board gender
representation quotas, as well for empirical research, given that by explaining firms’ heterogeneity
solely by firm characteristics one may miss individual attributes, like gender, as important
determinants of these differences.
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3.6 Appendix A. Variable definitions
Book-to-market: firms book value divided by the market value of common equity at the end
of the fiscal year.
Exec_Female: an indicator variable taking the value 1 if a firm has a female and 0 if it has a
male executive.
Female: an indicator variable for whether the firm is a male-to-female transition firm. (note: this
definition applies for the main sample of our study, i.e., the one comprised of only male-to-male
and male-to-female transition firms. For tests using the extended sample consisting of all types
of executive switches, Female is an indicator variable taking value 1 when a firm has switched to
a female executive (i.e., from male-to-female or female-to-female) and 0 if it has switched to a
male executive(i.e., from male-to-male or female-to-male).
Financial reporting quality: as a proxy for financial reporting quality we use discretionary
accruals as measured by the Lagged Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (2003). The proxy
for discretionary accruals is given by the residuals from the following regression:
TAi,t
Assetsi,t
= α+ β0
1
Assetsi,t−1
+ β1
(1 + k)∆Salesi,t −∆Reci,t
Assetsi,t−1
+ β2
PPEi,t
Assetsi,t−1
+ β3TAi,t−1 +
β4ROAi,t−1 + β5SGi,t−1 + εi,t
where k is the slope coefficient from a regression of ∆Rec on ∆Sales for each two-digit SIC-year
grouping and captures the expected change in accounts receivables for a given change in sales.
Market Equity: the share price at the end of the fiscal year times the number of shares
outstanding.
Post: an indicator variable for whether the observation is after an executive transition.
ROA: income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.
Size: the logarithm of market equity.
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3.6 Appendix B. Example of the computation of risk-adjusted returns
What follows is an illustrative example of the steps we took for computing the profitability
measure of insider trading. Let’s assume that (all the) insiders of firm X trade in the following
days throughout our sample period:
June 7, 2006: 5 shares bought and 8 shares sold
December 21, 2006: 3 shares bought and 2 shares sold
March 5, 2007: 8 shares bought and 9 shares sold
First, we compute the net number of shares traded by all insiders of firm X: that is, 3 shares
sold on June 7, 2006; 1 share purchased on December 21 etc. Next, for each firm-transaction
date, we use daily returns over the next 180 days to estimate separately the four-factor Fama
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model below, and we retain the coefficients.
Ri −Rf = α+ β1(Rm −Rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML+ β4UMD + ε
where Ri is firm’s i daily return, Rf is the daily risk-free interest rate, Rm is the CRSP value-
weighted market return, and SMB, HML and UMD are the Size, Book-to-market and Momentum
factors from the four-factor Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model, obtained from
Kenneth R. French’s website:
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Therefore
after this step we will have a database of 3 intercepts (alphas), 3 coefficients for the abnormal
market returns factor, 3 coefficients for the SMB factor and so on. The same will happen in the
case of all the other firms in our sample. Note that there may be repeated observations across
dates (e.g., June 7, 2006 appears more than once because insiders at other firms trade as well in
that day) and across firms (e.g., insiders at firm X trade in several dates). Hence, we cluster by
firm and by transaction day in order to draw inferences on the average alpha value as reported
in Table 3.3.
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3.6 Appendix C. Propensity Score Matching
We use the propensity score matching methodology in order to construct a matched-control group
of firms that are similar to treatment firms across a set of relevant observable firm characteristics.
The steps of the analysis are as follows. We start with the complete dataset (86 treatment
firms and 1276 non-treatment firms; we will select the control group out of the latter). We run
a probit model within each fiscal year on lagged variables that are shown in the literature to
predict the likelihood for a firm to have a female executive:
Prob(Treat = 1) = 11+e−βX where:
βX = α0 + α1ROA+ α2Size+ α3BTM + α4CEO + Y ear + Industry + ε
Treat=1 if a firm is in the treatment group (e.g., if it had a male-to-female CEO or CFO
transition) and all explanatory variables are one-year lagged, except for CEO. All variables are
described in Appendix A.
We base our choice of the variables to include in the probit model on Huang & Kisgen (2013)
who examine the characteristics that make it more likely for a firm to change their CEO or CFO
from male to female.
We store the fitted values of the probit model; they represent the propensity scores or the
probabilities that a firm receives the treatment, given the set of independent variables. A high
R− squared of the model shows that it successfully captures the relevant factors determining a
firm to have a male-to-female CEO or CFO transition. Significant coefficients of the model show
that the independent variables are relevant in a firm’s decision to incur such a transition.
For every event-year in the treatment group we select the closest non-treatment firm in terms of
propensity score that has a male-to-male CEO or CFO transition in the same year using the
“nearest-neighbor” without replacement matching procedure. Our final sample is consisted of 50
pairs of treatment firms and 50 matched controls.
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3.6 Appendix D. Insider trading restriction proxy
In order to compute our measure for insider trading restrictions, we use an approach similar to
the one proposed by Roulstone (2003). We use earnings announcement dates are taken from
Compustat Quarterly. Bettis et al. (2000) finds via surveys that firms allow insiders to trade
only in the one-month period following an earnings announcements. Following this guidance, a
trade is considered to be made during an allowed trading window if it occurs within the first
third (approximately 20 trading days, 30 calendar days) of the period between two consecutive
earnings announcements. Therefore the allowed trading window is considered to be the period
closely following an earnings announcement (approximately the first third of the interval between
two earnings announcements) and the “blackout period” is considered the window before an
earnings announcement (approximately the last two thirds of the interval between two earnings
announcements). A firm is considered to be more restricted the higher the percentage of trades
placed during the period comprised between two earnings announcements take place during the
allowed trading window.
For every year, the variable PercentageSafe is calculated as the percentage of shares traded
during the allowed trading window over the total number of shares traded during the period
between two consecutive earnings announcements. For simplicity, we compute PercentageSafe
only during the last quarter of each fiscal year.
For firms with missing information about earnings announcement dates, we estimate Percent-
ageSafe as follows. We regress PercentageSafe for firms with complete information on variables
shown to be good predictors of firms insider trading restrictions: firm size, book to market
and the ratio of number of annual shares bought to total shares trades by insiders of a firm
as a measure of the intensity of insider trading activity within the firm (Roulstone (2003)).
We then use the obtained fitted values to calculate the level of trades performed during the
allowed trading window for firms with missing earnings announcement dates. Our insider trading
restrictions proxy (ITR) is given by the values of PercentageSafe.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Distribution of executives by gender and transition year
Transition Year
Gender 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
FEMALE 7 5 10 11 17 12 11 12 1 86
8.14% 5.81% 11.63% 12.79% 19.77% 13.95% 12.79% 13.95% 1.16%
MALE 117 147 157 153 180 182 188 147 5 1276
9.17% 11.52% 12.30% 11.99% 14.11% 14.26% 14.73% 11.52% 0.39%
Panel B: Distribution of executives by gender and industry affiliation
Industry
Gender Consumer Health Manufacture Utilities Technology Energy Chemicals Other Total
FEMALE 23 14 12 6 5 4 3 19 86
26.74% 16.28% 13.95% 6.98% 5.81% 4.65% 3.49% 22.09%
MALE 240 330 188 102 36 58 62 260 1276
18.81% 25.86% 14.73% 7.99% 2.82% 4.55% 4.86% 20.38%
This table presents the distribution of the executives in our sample by gender, transition year and industry affiliations. The transition year is the first year that
the executive shows up on the annual report. The industry affiliation is defined following Fama & French classification, available at:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
25
3 CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading
Table 3.2: Insider trading profitability, size, book-to-market, and profitability around exec-
utive transitions
Male-to-Male Before transition
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Annual Avg. Trading Profit 2383 0.0006 0.0082 0.0004 -0.0203 0.0200
Size 2382 7.7540 1.5334 7.6530 3.8379 11.3555
BTM 2382 0.4540 0.2998 0.3972 -0.0732 2.7895
ROA 2382 0.0467 0.0870 0.0532 -0.5457 0.1996
Male-to-Male After transition
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Annual Avg. Trading Profit 2256 -0.0001 0.0069 0.0000 -0.0203 0.0200
Size 2256 7.6962 1.5421 7.6087 3.8379 11.3555
BTM 2256 0.5210 0.3553 0.4675 -0.0732 2.7895
ROA 2256 0.0415 0.0931 0.0508 -0.5457 0.1996
Male-to-Female Before transition
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Annual Avg. Trading Profit 165 0.0024 0.0075 0.0016 -0.0192 0.0200
Size 165 7.9191 1.6334 7.6485 3.9811 11.3555
BTM 165 0.4583 0.3475 0.3912 -0.0732 2.7895
ROA 165 0.0596 0.0868 0.0653 -0.5457 0.1941
Male-to-Female After transition
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Annual Avg. Trading Profit 155 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000 -0.0186 0.0197
Size 155 7.8907 1.6933 7.8318 3.8379 11.3555
BTM 155 0.5433 0.3475 0.5134 -0.0097 2.6771
ROA 155 0.0506 0.0902 0.0541 -0.5260 0.1951
This table presents the descriptive statistics of insider trading, size, book-to-market and firm profitability
by executive gender before and after the transition years. See Appendix A for the defitions of the
variables. All variables are winsorised yearly at 2.5% level.
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Table 3.3: Insider trading profits
All trades Purchase Trades Sales Trades
TradingProfiti,t 0.0007*** -0.0066*** 0.0074***
(4.4) (-41.25) (41.12)
α -0.0072*** -0.0066*** -0.0074***
(-44.68) (-41.25) (-41.12)
(Rmkt −Rf ) 0.0144*** 0.0105*** 0.0104***
(134.67) (108.46) (119.24)
SMB 0.0056* 0.0060*** 0.0055***
(33.17) (28.82) (29.37)
HML 0.0005*** 0.0019*** 0.0000
(-2.82) (10.75) (0.15)
UMD -0.0002** -0.0012*** 0.0001
(-2.25) (-10.2) (1.03)
Avg.AdjustedR2 36.53 36.63 36.49
N 163785 44765 119020
This table presents estimates of trade-specific profits TradingProfiti,t and coefficients from estimating
transaction-day specific regressions of daily returns on common factors over the 180 days following each
transaction: (Ri −Rf ) = α+ β1(Rmkt −Rf ) + β2SMB + β3HML+ β4UMD+ e. Ri is the daily return
to firm i’s equity; Rf is the daily risk-free interest rate; Rmkt is the CRSP value-weighted market return;
and SMB, HML, and UMD are the size, book-to-market, and momentum factors (Fama and French
[1993], Carhart [1997]). Avg.AdjustedR2 is presented in percentages. TradingProfiti,t is equal to α(-α)
for purchases (sales).
Table 3.4: Female Executives and Daily Average Insider Trading Profitability
CEO & CFO CEO CFO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exec_Female -
0.0008***
-
0.0007***
-
0.0027***
-
0.0027***
-0.0001 -0.0000
(-2.96) (-2.74) (-5.46) (-5.30) (-0.34) (-0.06)
Size -
0.0001***
-0.0000 -
0.0003***
(-3.96) (-0.26) (-5.61)
BTM -
0.0023***
-
0.0010***
-
0.0042***
(-16.20) (-5.33) (-17.87)
ROA 0.0032*** 0.0061*** -0.0003
(7.16) (9.51) (-0.41)
Constant 0.0021*** 0.0042*** 0.0021*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0065***
(39.22) (13.12) (28.74) (5.23) (26.80) (14.02)
N 40441 40432 23297 23288 17144 17144
AdjustedR2 0.02 0.68 0.12 0.66 0.00 1.37
This table presents the regressions results of having a female executive on the daily average insider trading profitability
measure. The test is based on the full panel of firms for the mixed CEO and CFO, only CEO, and only CFO samples
respectively. AdjustedR2 is presented in percentages. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White
standard errors. All variables are winsorised yearly at 2.5% level.
* Denote statistical significance at 10% level
** Denote statistical significance at 5% level
*** Denote statistical significance at 1% level.
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Table 3.5: Female Executives and the Annual Average Trading Profitability of Insider Trad-
ing
(1) (2) (3)
Post -0.0020*** -0.0019** -0.0029*
(-2.62) (-2.42) (-1.75)
Size -0.0003 -0.0002
(-1.39) (-0.27)
ROA 0.0033 0.0016
(1.00) (0.35)
BTM -0.0013 -0.0013
(-1.56) (-0.86)
Constant 0.0019*** 0.0050**
(13.08) (2.29) (-0.63)
Year effect No No Yes
Industry effect No No Yes
N 282 282 282
R2 0.0246 0.0345 0.3709
This table presents regression results on how transition from male to female executives affects firm’s
insider trading profitability. Our sample for these tests consists of 282 firm-year observations from 86
male-to-female transitions between 2003 and 2011. The table reports how the male-to-female transitions
affect the annual trading profitability of insider trading. See Appendix A for the definition of all the
variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are
winsorized yearly at 2.5% level.
* Denote statistical significance at 10% level
** Denote statistical significance at 5% level
*** Denote statistical significance at 1% level.
28
3 CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading
Table 3.6: Female Executives and Insider Trading Profitability
Panel A: Difference-in-difference regressions
(1) (2)
Post -0.0006** -0.0007**
(-1.99) (-2.26)
Female x Post -0.0007 -0.0012**
(-1.64) (-2.04)
Size -0.0001 -0.0008**
(-1.29) (-2.41)
ROA 0.0037*** 0.0004
(2.74) (0.24)
BTM 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.01) (-0.99)
Constant 0.0025 0.0060**
(0.78) (2.17)
Year Effect Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes No
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes
R2 0.1502 0.4422
N 4347 4347
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching
Female -0.0021**
(-1.97)
Size -0.0007**
(-2.06)
ROA -0.0022*
(-1.93)
BTM 0.0003
(0.08)
Constant 0.0080**
(2.08)
Year Effect Yes
Industry Effect Yes
R2 0.3591
N 501
This table reports results on insider trading profitability using two specifications. Panel A presents difference-in-difference
results from Eq. (3.4), based on a sample of 86 male-to-female(treatment) and 1276 male-to-male (control) switches.
Panel B reports results based on a propensity score matching approach, for which we used a sample of male-to-female and
male-to-male matched control firms. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All
variables are winsorized yearly at 2.5% level
* Denote statistical significance at 10% level
** Denote statistical significance at 5% level
*** Denote statistical significance at 1% level.
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Table 3.7: Instrumental variable approach and Reversal firms
Panel A: Instrumental variable approach
First stage Second stage
Size 0.0003 -0.0001
(0.09) (-0.75)
ROA 0.1258*** 0.0083***
(3.18) (5.32)
BTM -0.0074 -0.0009**
(-0.60) (-2.47)
Gender Equality Index 0.2542***
(3.73)
FemaleIV -0.0137*
(-1.65)
Constant 0.1057 0.0028
(1.26) (0.94)
Year Effect Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes
F-stat 13.92
(p-value) (0.0002)
Anderson underident. test (χ2) 16.01
(p-value) (0.0001)
N 6676 6676
Panel B: Reversal firms
(1) (2)
Post 0.0034** 0.0031*
(2.04) (1.89)
Size 0.0001
(0.36)
ROA -0.0031
(-0.33)
BTM 0.0014
(1.11)
Constant -0.0007 -0.0019
(-1.05) (-0.65)
Year Effect Yes Yes
R2 0.0533 0.0600
N 124 124
This table reports results on insider trading profitability using two specifications. Panel A presents results of a 2SLS
instrumental variable approach. Panel B reports results based on a subsample of 24 firms that switch back to a male
executive following. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are
winsorized yearly at 2.5% level
* Denote statistical significance at 10% level
** Denote statistical significance at 5% level
*** Denote statistical significance at 1% level.
30
3 CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading
Table 3.8: Alternative channels of the Gender-Insider trading relation: Earnings manage-
ment and Insider trading restrictions
Earnings management Insider trading restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post -0.0002 -0.0029* 0.0263 -0.0028*
(-0.01) (-1.92) (0.44) (-1.72)
Size 0.0044 -0.0003 0.0365 -0.0000
(0.64) (-0.59) (1.36) (-0.06)
ROA 0.2377** 0.0032 -0.3168 0.0020
(1.99) (0.67) (-1.29) (0.42)
BTM -0.0349 -0.0013 0.0547 -0.0007
(-1.35) (-0.86) (0.83) (-0.46)
EM 0.0009
(0.14)
ITR -0.0039**
(-2.10)
Constant -0.1613** 0.0027 0.2492 0.0031
(-2.16) (0.60) (0.83) (0.64)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.4676 0.4008 0.3462 0.3860
N 214 271 219 281
This table presents results of two channels that may explain the documented relation between executive gender and
insider trading. Columns (1) and (2) present how female executive influence earnings management, and what is the effect
of switching to a female executive on insider trading profitability when including an additional control for financial
reporting quality. Columns (3) and (4) present how female executive influence the adoption of insider trading restrictions,
and what is the effect of switching to a female executive on insider trading profitability when including an additional
control for insider trading restrictions. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All
variables are winsorized yearly at 2.5% level
* Denote statistical significance at 10% level
** Denote statistical significance at 5% level
*** Denote statistical significance at 1% level.
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4.1 Introduction
This study provides evidence that firm self-adopted insider trading restrictions are associated
with a decrease in the level of earnings management. Because we cannot directly observe
the extent to which a firm adopts such insider trading restrictions, we operationalize it by
developing a measure based on the timing of trades by insiders for each firm with respect to two
consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. We find that firms that are identified as adopters
of insider trading restrictions (also referred to as blackout-periods) have a lower level of earnings
manipulation in the subsequent quarters. Our findings are robust to different specifications
that include controls for firm characteristics that are known to be associated with earnings
management.
We predict that earnings management is negatively associated with a firm being an insider
trading restrictions adopter. The basis for our prediction is the vast empirical literature that
examines managerial incentives to manipulate earnings, and in particular, the association between
characteristics of the firm’s financial reporting environment and the extent to which managers
extract rents from insider trading. This literature suggests, on the one hand, that insiders benefit
from more opaque environments (Tang et al. (2012)), and on the other hand that such benefits
may actually incentivize insiders to further manipulate earnings (Beneish and Vargus (2002)).
As investors gain access to relevant and reliable information about a company’s prospects, this
information asymmetry decreases, allowing investors to make informed decisions. Financial
reporting represents one important source of information about the firm to investors: the higher
the quality of financial reporting, the smaller the gap between insiders’ and outsiders’ level
of information about the firm. The dimension of financial reporting quality that we focus on
in this paper is accruals-based and real earnings management. We expect that insiders may
manipulate earnings in order to enhance information asymmetries between themselves and
outsiders. Therefore, if the firm adopts blackout periods that restrict insiders from trading, the
incentives to manipulate earnings stemming from the potential to gain profits from trading with
their own company’s shares should be reduced after such restrictions become effective.
Previous studies have largely focused on the consequences of mandatory regulation intended to
improve earnings management, and they document an unwanted substitution effect between
reduced accruals management and increased real transaction management following such measures.
We take a different approach from these studies and study a self-imposed, internal corporate
governance mechanism of the firm, and show that it effectively reduces managerial incentives to
manipulate earnings. We conceptualize that the decision to adopt insider trading restrictions
represents a shock to insiders’ incentives to trade. Moreover, in the case of those managers who
also have discretionary power over financial reporting, we expect that such restrictions translate
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into a shock to their incentives to manage earnings as well. Most importantly, we find that not
only does accruals-based earnings management decrease following the adoption of insider trading
restrictions, but the same happens with real transactions management, and as a result, with the
overall level of earnings management.
Because the exact date when a firm has adopted blackout periods is hard to observe by the
researcher, we compute our insider trading restrictions proxy based on observable trading
patterns: the timing and the number of trades performed by insiders of the company. We
categorize each trade performed during two consecutive earnings announcement dates either into
the allowed trading window (i.e., the first third of the period between earnings announcements),
or into the restricted trading window (i.e., the remaining two thirds of the same period). We
identify the quarter when a firm imposed blackout periods as the quarter with the highest
increase in the percentage of trades taking place in the allowed trading window, conditional on
the firm consistently maintaining a high percentage of trades in the same window during all the
following quarters.
We test the predicted relation between earnings management and insider trading restrictions
using several approaches. We begin the analysis with a validity test for our identification
procedure of the event-quarter when insider trading restriction became effective, and find that
the volume of insider trading significantly decreases following these measures being adopted.
In the first test, we focus on the full sample of insider trading restrictions adopters. After
controlling for a series of firm characteristics that are shown in the literature to be associated
with earnings management, we document a significant decrease in our measures of earnings
management in the period following the adoption of blackout periods. For our second test, we
use seemingly unrelated regressions, which permit for regression errors to be correlated across
the accruals-based and the real earnings management equations. The results confirm our main
finding.
In the third specification, we use propensity score matching to build a matched sample of
adopters and non-adopters of blackout periods that are similar across a series of variables likely
to predict the adoption of trading restrictions. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find
that trading windows adopters document a higher decrease in both accruals and real transaction
management relative to their non-adopter peers. Overall, our results are consistent with firms
enjoying lower levels of earnings manipulation following the adoption of blackout periods across
all specifications.
Finally, we provide evidence that in the period following the trading windows adoption, firms
enjoy lower cost of equity capital. This result provides insights about the dynamics of the
complete process for companies that restrict trading windows: following the adoption of such
measures, firms enjoy less noisy earnings information (via lower overall earnings manipulation),
which translate into lower cost of capital for the firm.
We are aware of some potential limitations of this work. While it is the firm-imposed nature
of the restrictions we study that allows us to identify a mechanism that successfully reduces
earnings management, it is precisely the endogenous nature of this setting that leaves us with
the endogeneity caveat. We control for a battery of corporate governance measures and use a
difference-in differences approach in order to alleviate this concern, but despite these efforts we
can’t rule out the possibility that unobserved internal corporate governance mechanisms of the
firm are (partly) responsible for our result.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the earnings
management research by identifying a mechanism that allows firms to enjoy lower levels of
earnings manipulations: restricting insiders from trading outside an allowed trading window
between two consecutive earnings announcement dates. Studies focusing on mandatory financial
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reporting regulations systematically document that such measures come with increased overall
measures of earnings management. Relative to these papers, the setting we study allows us
to isolate a firm-imposed corporate governance mechanism that effectively reduces managerial
incentives to manipulate total earnings.
Second, we contribute to the strand of insider trading literature that analyzes reasons for firms
to impose their own trading restrictions. If informed trading is undesirable by shareholders or
illegal, firms’ interest in implementing insider trading restrictions would be justified. Prior work
has extensively analyzed the opportunistic behavior of insiders, and most of these efforts have
been concerned with the efficiency of mandatory regulation in place in preventing it. Despite the
large number of firms imposing blackout periods, little is known about the benefits motivating
firms to undertake such measures. Some economists argue that restrictions on insider trading
impose costs on insiders and on the firms that contract with them (Manne (1966)). Others
argue that restricting insider trading reduces the adverse selection problem in a firm’s securities
(Fishman and Hagerty (1992)), which manifests itself into cost of capital benefits for the firm.
And finally, some others find that such restrictions are adopted for “window-dressing” rather
than economical reasons, given that they are not effective unless supported by other corporate
governance mechanisms (Jagolinzer et al. (2011)).
In order for firms to decide to impose restricted trading windows, the benefits must outweigh
the costs of these measures. This study is among the first to document one reason that may
explain firms’ decision to restrict informed trades: we find that restrictions on corporate insiders’
trades are associated with an improvement in the financial reporting quality as measured by the
extent of earnings manipulations. This evidence is consistent with the idea that not only does
restricting insider trading reduce the extent to which insiders can extract private benefits at the
expense of less informed investors, but it also improves the ability of outside investors to make
informed decisions about the firm by providing them with better financial information.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on the relation between insider trading and
financial reporting quality. Extant studies do not reach an agreement regarding the causality
direction between these two concepts. We examine this relation in the context of a firm-level
shock to insiders’ trading incentives. We document an increase in earnings quality after the
restrictions become effective, consistent with the idea that one of the reasons for insiders to
manipulate earnings is to extract higher rents from their trades.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the basis for our predictions
and provides a literature review of relevant papers in the field. Section 3 presents the data
and the proxies for our variables of interest. Section 4 explains our research design, Section 5
presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Basis for prediction and related research
We predict that earnings management decreases after the adoption of firm-level insider trading
restrictions. There is an extensive literature showing that insider trading is more profitable
the larger the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders. The asymmetry
of information increases as accruals quality improves. Therefore, we expect that earnings
management is negatively associated with the adoption of insider trading restrictions based on
the following reasoning.
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4.2.1 Insider trading incentives and earnings management
In order to allow financial reports to convey managers’ information about their firm’s performance,
standards allow managers, who also fall under SEC’s definition of a firm’s insiders, a certain
level of discretion in exercising judgment over financial reporting. Executives have the ability
to choose the reporting measures, estimates and disclosures that provide the most informative
image of the firm’s underlying economics (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). However, it is precisely
this managerial discretion that also creates opportunities for earnings manipulations, reducing
the quality of the financial information available to outside investors.
Motives for earnings management have been largely studied in the accounting literature. For
example, managers with higher stock and option-based compensation are more sensitive to stock
prices changes, and therefore managers’ choices of accounting practices may be influenced by
their compensation incentives. Cheng and Warfield (2005) finds that managers with high equity
incentives are more likely to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares
to be sold; in this sense, managers with high equity incentives report earnings that meet or just
beat analysts’ forecasts. Teoh et al. (1998) provides evidence that issuers with unusually high
accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock returns in the three years following the IPO,
suggesting that earnings management may be used for window-dressing before public securities
offerings.
Insiders face an agency problem. On the one hand, they are responsible for making decisions
that maximize firm value and for designing disclosure policies that maximize the information
available to outside investors. On the other hand, their private information creates an incentive
to obtain profits via insider trading, and these profits increase with the extent of their information
advantage.
Extant studies suggest that higher informativeness of insider trading is associated with lower
financial reporting quality. Most papers consider firm’s disclosures as exogenous and point
towards insiders taking advantage of the quality and timing of these disclosures and of their
access to private information to trade opportunistically (Aboody et al. (2005); Maffett (2012);
Gu and Li (2012)). However, it is important to note that some insiders (i.e., managers) also
have the power to affect the disclosure policy of their firm. This approach is proposed by
papers like Beneish and Vargus (2002), Cheng and Lo (2006), Rogers (2008). Given that insider
trading yields higher returns in firms with more information asymmetries and lower reporting
quality (Aboody et al. (2005); Frankel and Li (2004); Huddart and Ke (2007)), insider trading
opportunities may incentivize insiders to supply low quality information to outsiders with the
purpose of increasing their own informational advantage over outsiders and extracting greater
trading profits. Therefore, in addition to crowding out investors by limiting their gains from
information acquisition, insider trading may incentivize insiders to adversely affect the quality
of the information supplied to outside investors (Zhang and Zhang (2012)).
One paper that follows a similar reasoning pattern is Beneish and Vargus (2002), who finds
evidence consistent with some managers inflating earnings in order to sell their firms’ stocks
at higher prices. Although the evidence they present only covers the abnormal insider selling
subsample, they encourage future research to investigate whether it is particularly insider trading
opportunities that provide an incentive for earnings management. Similarly, Cheng and Warfield
(2005) finds that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management. Specifically, the
study documents that managers with high equity incentives are motivated to engage in earnings
management to increase the value of the shares to be sold in the future.
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While most of the extant literature to date has focused on federal regulation of insider trading,
few papers have focused on the efforts made by firms themselves make to prevent insiders from
trading opportunistically. Bettis et al. (2000) finds that 92% of the companies in their sample
allow their insiders to trade only during a short window following earnings announcements.
Below is an excerpt from the document regulating trading by insiders from Netflix, INC:
The Company has determined that all officers, directors, and [those who fall under the description
of an insider of the company1], shall be prohibited from buying, selling or otherwise effecting
transactions in any stock or other securities of the Company or derivative securities thereof
EXCEPT during the following trading window: Beginning at the open of market on the trading
day following the date of public disclosure of the Company’s financial results for a preceding
calendar quarter or year and ending at the close of market on the 10th day of the second calendar
month of the current calendar quarter (the “Open Window”).
(Netflix, INC. Insider Trading Policy)
Most importantly, extant studies find that insider trading restrictions successfully suppress both
purchases and sales performed by insiders (Bettis et al. (2000), Roulstone (2003)).
Based on the above discussion, we predict that the extent of earnings manipulations decreases in
the quarters following the adoption of insider trading restrictions. If insiders are able to extract
higher personal profits from trading after manipulating earnings, then part of the earnings
management performed by the firm may be justified by such incentives. If that is the case,
trading restrictions represent a shock to insiders’ incentives to manipulate earnings, either via
accruals-based or real earnings management. In order to study the causality direction of this
relation, we analyze the effect that the event of adopting firm-level blackout periods has on
financial reporting quality. Specifically, those managers for whom insider trading profits represent
a motive to manipulate earnings would face lower such incentives once firm-level policies restrict
them to trade.
Alternatively, it could be the case that insider trading and earnings management are substitutes
in determining insiders’ gains. That is, when faced with restrictions on trading, insiders may
increase the extent of earnings manipulations in order to insure themselves a similar profits
level. If that is the case, then which of these potential effects prevails is an econometric exercise.
Our findings support the idea that insider trading restrictions reduce insiders’ incentives to
manipulate earnings.
A closely related paper to our analysis is the work by Zhang and Zhang (2012), that studies that
first-time enforcement of insider trading laws in 39 countries on insiders’ supply of information.
While their finding that insider trading motivates insiders to reduce financial reporting quality
is consistent with our hypothesis, our paper differs from Zhang and Zhang (2012) in two critical
aspects. First, we analyze firm-level restrictions rather than country-level insider trading law
enforcement. Despite the finding by Bettis et al. (2000) that a large number of firms have such
restrictions in place, it is not clear what motivates shareholders to incur the costs of imposing
blackout periods. We propose that shareholders restrict insider trading in order to reduce
managers’ incentives to reduce financial reporting quality as measured by the extent of earnings
management. Second, by focusing only on a U.S. sample, our inferences are not subject to
cross-country consistency issues regarding financial reporting or insider trading.
If insiders profit from their access to private information, and these profits are higher when the
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is higher, then restricting insider trading
1Text in brackets is adapted from the original text for readability.
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may diminish managers’ incentives to negatively affect the financial reporting quality. Based on
these arguments, we hypothesize that firm-level insider trading restrictions lead to improved
financial reporting quality as measured by lower levels of earnings management.
4.2.2 Accruals-based versus real transaction earnings management
Earnings management is considered as situations when managers use judgment in financial
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stake-
holders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Managers
may attempt to achieve certain earnings target either via accruals manipulations, with no
direct cash flow consequences (like under-provisioning for bad-debt expenses or delaying assets
write-offs), or via real transaction management, which affect cash flows (like price discounts or
reduction of discretionary expenditures).
Previous studies have generally documented a substitution between reduced accruals management
and increased real transaction management following regulation intended to improve earnings
quality. For example, the rational expectation equilibrium model developed by Ewert and
Wagenhofer (2005) shows that an unwanted consequence of tighter accounting standards is that,
by reducing discretionary accruals, they may induce managers to resort other forms of earnings
management, like real transaction management. Consistent with this finding, Cohen et al. (2008)
finds that following the passage of SOX, accruals management decreases while real earnings
management increases. In a similar fashion, Chan et al. (2015) documents a substitution effect
between accruals and real earnings management after companies adopt compensation recovery
policies (also known as “clawbacks”).
While they focus on events that represent external shocks to earnings management instruments,
which are ineffective in reducing total EM, we propose that self-adopted insider trading restrictions
represent a shock to managerial incentives to trade, and, therefore, to manipulate earnings in
order to increase insider trading profits. Hence, we expect that blackout periods represent a
conjuncture where both real and accruals-based earnings management are reduced by an internal
firm policy. Specifically, we predict that the adoption of firm-level insider trading restrictions
lead to a decrease in both real and accruals-based earnings management.
4.3 Data and measurement choice
4.3.1 Sample selection
Our proxy for insider trading restrictions requires the dates of insider trades and quarterly
earnings announcement, and the financial reporting quality measure is calculated using commonly
used in the literature discretionary accruals models. The data on insider trades are available
from Thomson Financial Insider Filings. The quarterly earnings announcement dates, as well
as accounting information for computing the discretionary accruals measures are obtained
from Compustat Quarterly. Corporate governance measures are obtained from I/B/E/S and
RiskMetrics.
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In order to avoid bias in our earnings management measure, we start by computing discretionary
accruals using the entire universe of firms covered by Compustat Quarterly. We then merge the
resulting sample with the other databases, drop financial firms, and require all firms to have
minimum one observation before and one observation after the date when trading restrictions
become effective. We distinguish between treatment and control firms by defining a treatment
firm as one that has incurred a large jump in PercentageSafe (the ratio of trades during the
safe-to-trade period to the total volume of trades over the entire quarter) as compared to the
average value of PercentageSafe of the same period of all previous quarters, and has maintained
the value of PercentageSafe high over all the following quarters2.
The resulting sample consists of 229 total distinct treatment firms and 1939 total distinct control
firms over the period 2001-2013.
4.3.2 Insider trading restrictions proxy
Bettis et al. (2000) finds that the most common restriction firms impose on insider trading is to
allow them to trade only during a period closely following earnings announcements.
However, the exact date when blackout periods are imposed by a firm are an internal decision
of the company, and therefore hard to observe by the researcher. Our way around this issue is
to use an indirect measure of insider trading restrictions, based on observable trading patterns
by insiders. We follow Roulstone (2003) in considering the allowed trading window as the first
third (approximately one calendar month or 20 trading days) of the period comprised between
two consecutive quarterly earnings announcements. Further, we compute PercentageSafe as the
ratio of the number of trades during the allowed trading window to the total number of trades
during the quarter.
Figure 4.1: Summary of the allowed and restricted insider trading windows
For each firm in our sample, we define EventDate as the quarter when the largest increase
in PercentageSafe was recorded compared to the average value of the same variable over all
previous quarters. EventDate is our proxy for the date when the firm has started to have insider
trading restrictions in place. In order to consider that a firm restricts insider trading, we follow
Lee et al. (2013) and additionally require for PercentageSafe to be higher than a benchmark
value in all subsequent quarters. Specifically, a firm is considered to fall in the treatment group
(that is, a firm that has imposed insider trading restrictions) if at least 70% of all quarterly
trades take place in the allowed trading window) during all the quarters following EventDate
2See the following Insider trading restrictions proxy section and Appendix A for details about how we calculate
PercentageSafeand how we identify the quarter when insider trading restrictions became effective.
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(i.e., PercentageSafe is maintained at a minimum level of 70% in all quarters subsequent to the
restrictions adoption).
4.3.3 Accruals-based earnings management proxy
We compute our accruals management proxy by estimating the following model cross-sectionally
for industry-quarters with minimum 10 observations, using the entire Compustat quarterly
universe:
TAi,q
Assetsi,q−1
= α+ β0
1
Assetsi,q−1
+ β1
∆Salesi,q −∆Reci,q
Assetsi,q−1
+ β2
PPEi,q
Assetsi,q−1
+
β3ROAi,q−4 + β4SGi,q−4 + εi,q(4.1)
TA is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the operating cash
flow reported in the statement of cash flows3. ∆Sales is the change in sales, ∆Rec is the change
in accounts receivable, PPE is gross property, plant and equipment. Following Collins et al.
(2012), we include as additional regressors the value of ROA in the same quarter of the previous
year, ROAi,q−4, and SGi,q−4, the growth in sales since the same quarter of the previous year.
All the variables, including the intercept, are scaled by total assets at the end of the previous
quarter, and we also include an unscaled intercept in our regressions. The estimated residuals
from Equation (1) are our discretionary accruals.
4.3.4 Real transaction management proxy
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we compute three proxies of real transaction management:
ABExp, ABProd and ABCash, which measure abnormal levels of discretionary expenses, produc-
tion costs and cash flow from operating expenses, respectively. Our measures are given by the
residuals from estimating Equations (2) to (4) by quarter and 2-digit SIC code for the entire
universe of Compustat quarterly.
Expensei,q
Assetsi,q−1
= α+ β0
1
Assetsi,q−1
+ β1
Salesi,q−1
Assetsi,q−1
+ +εi,q (4.2)
Productioni,q
Assetsi,q−1
= α+β0
1
Assetsi,q−1
+β1
Salesi,q
Assetsi,q−1
+β2
∆Salesi,q
Assetsi,q−1
+β3
∆Salesi,q−1
Assetsi,q−1
+εi,q (4.3)
CFOi,q
Assetsi,q−1
= α+ β0
1
Assetsi,q−1
+ β1
Salesi,q
Assetsi,q−1
+ β2
∆Salesi,q
Assetsi,q−1
+ εi,q (4.4)
Roychowdhury (2006) states that managers may reduce discretionary expenditures (like R&D
expenses or advertising), to boost short-term earnings. Positive values of ABProd indicates
3We undo the year-to-date values in the statement of cash flows in order to arrive at the quarterly figure.
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inventory overproduction to report lower COGS per unit and boost operating income. Finally,
offering price discounts or lenient credit terms leads to accelerated sales and inflated sales revenue,
although these practices may decrease operating cash flow (negative ABCash).
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Chan et al. (2015), we compute two overall measures
of real transactions management: RTM1 is the sum between (-1) x ABCash and (-1) x ABExp,
and RTM2 is the sum of ABProd and (-1) x ABExp, such that the measures reflect earnings
management in a consistent fashion (the more positive the number is, the higher the earnings
manipulation).
4.4 Research design
4.4.1 Insider trading restrictions effectiveness in limiting insider trading
Previous work generally agrees on the fact that the type of restrictions analyzed in our paper
successfully limit the extent to which corporate insiders use their access to private information
to extract rents from outsiders (Bettis et al. (2000), Roulstone (2003)). However, Jagolinzer
et al. (2011) finds that restricted trading windows, by themselves, are not effective at restricting
insider trading. They find instead that when the general counsel approval is required to execute
a trade, insiders’ trading profits and the predictive ability of insider trades for future operating
performance are significantly lower.
Given this mixed evidence, we begin our analysis by testing whether blackout periods are effective
in reducing or suppressing informed trading by corporate insiders. We estimate the following
regression for the sample of blackout period adopters:
ITit = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Controlsit−1 + ui + qt + εit (4.5)
where ITit is the net purchase ratio or the net purchase ratio in dollar amount, respectively.
Postit+1 is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the treatment firm is in the quarters
following the period when the blackout period became effective, zero before the event, and a
missing value during the event quarter. ui and qt are firm fixed effects and quarter fixed effects,
respectively. We control for size, book-to-market, ROA, consistent with previous literature.
A negative and significant coefficient of Postit+1 would suggest that restricted trading are indeed
effective in reducing insiders’ ability to trade on private information.
4.4.2 Insider trading restrictions adopters
For this step in the analysis, we employ only the group of firms that have been identified by the
methodology explained in Section 3.2. as adopters of insider trading restrictions. To examine
the impact of firm-level blackout periods adoptions on the extent of earnings manipulation, we
estimate the following regression models:
AMit(orRTMit) = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Controlsit−1 + ui + qt + εit (4.6)
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where Postit+1 is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the treatment firm is in the
quarters following the period when the blackout period became effective, zero before the event,
and a missing value during the event quarter; AMit(orRTMit) is our earnings management proxy,
as described in Sections 3.3. and 3.4. ui and qt are firm fixed effects and quarter fixed effects,
respectively. We control for size, book-to-market, ROA. Following Chan et al. (2015), we include
NOA_d , Analyst and BoardIndep to acount for the costs related to earnings manipulation.
The use of accruals manipulation is constrained by the extent of engaging in such practices in
previous quarters, therefore we expect a negative association between NOA_d and the accruals
manipulation proxies. Next, we include the decile of Altman’s Z-Score to account for the finding
in Zang (2012) that firms with better financial health (higher Z-Score) are more likely to engage
in real earnings management. The same study suggests that firms with higher InstOwn incur
higher costs of engaging in real earnings management. Finally, following previous literature, we
include the lagged levels of AM (RTM) in the RTM (AM) regressions.
The coefficient of Postit+1 captures the impact that adopting insider trading restrictions has on
accruals and real earnings management. Notice that since our earnings manipulation measures
are given by the extent to which a firm manipulates earnings, the higher the level of AM (or
RTM), the lower the quality of a firm’s financial reporting. Therefore, we predict that the
coefficient of Postit+1 is negative and significant.
4.4.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
Additionally, we use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) to jointly estimate the regression
equations for accruals and real earnings management. The advantage of this estimation method
is that it allows for regression errors to be correlated across equations, which can potentially
increase the efficiency of the estimates (Zellner (1962)). Specifically, we estimate both equations
below, using a similar equation structure as before:
AMit = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Controlsit−1 + ui + qt + εit (4.7)
RTMit = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Controlsit−1 + ui + qt + εit (4.8)
As before, the coefficient of Postit+1 reflects the impact of insider trading restrictions has on
accruals and real transaction mangement, and our hypothesis predicts a negative and significant
coefficient for this variable.
4.4.4 Adopters versus non-adopters of insider trading restrictions
4.4.4.1 Propensity score matching
At the second step in the analysis we use a propensity score matching approach, which is more
robust to misspecification of the functional form of the underlying relation between earnings
management and the effective date of the insider trading restrictions than the typical regression
approach. Using this type of specification allows us to control for the endogeneity induced by a
preference of firms with a particular set of characteristics for adopting blackout periods.
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This research design allows us to compare changes in financial reporting quality between firms
that adopt insider trading restrictions and firms that are similar to the treated firms across a set
of relevant observable characteristics, but do not adopt blackout periods. In order to analyze
whether the adoption of insider trading restrictions is more likely in firms with lower ex-ante
information rents, we estimate the probability that a firm imposes such blackout periods as a
function of a set of corporate governance and information asymmetry variables found by the
literature to be relevant in predicting the likelihood for a firm to adopt blackout periods. For
each firm-quarter in the treatment group, we estimate the following probit model4:
Prob(Treat = 1) = 11+e(−„X) where:
βX = α0 + α1Size+ α2BTM + α3InsiderTrade+ α4Analyst+ ε
Treat=1 if a firm is in the treatment group (if it maintained a minimum of 70% value for
PercentageSafe in the periods subsequent to EventDate); all explanatory variables are one-year
lagged. All variables are described in Appendix A.
We base our choice of the variables to include in the probit model on the following arguments.
Roulstone (2003) suggests that restricted firms are larger than nonrestricted firms, have lower
BTM ratios, and are followed by more analysts. Jagolinzer et al. (2011) finds similar evidence,
and suggests the dollar-volume of insider trading as another predictor of the likelihood for a
firm to adopt trading restrictions.
We store the fitted values of the probit model; they represent the propensity scores or the
probabilities that a firm receives the treatment, given the set of independent variables.
For every event-quarter in the treatment group we select the closest non-treatment firm in terms
of propensity score and from the same year using the nearest-neighbor, no replacement matching
procedure. Given that we estimate a probit model per each fiscal year, the closest matches will
only be selected out of controls from the same fiscal year.5
For each firm in the control group, a pseudo-event is generated in the same quarter as its
corresponding treatment firm. We require all firm to have at least one observation before and
after the pseudo-event. Our final sample consists of 47 pairs of treatment firms and matched
controls.
The fitted values of the probit model represent the propensity scores. We select the match for
a treatment firm as a firm that does not adopt blackout periods, is in the same year as the
treatment firm and is the closest to the treatment firm in terms of propensity scores; the set of
obtained matches are referred to as the control group.
4.4.4.2 Regression analysis on the matched sample
Once the complete database of treatment and matched controls is created, we resume our sample
to the three quarters before and three quarters after the event for each firm. We conduct the
difference-in-differences test below:
4Because using only firm-quarters that result from the merge between the four databases dramatically reduces
our matched control sample, for this step in the analysis we use the sample resulting from the merge between
Thomson Financial Insider Filings, Compustat and I/B/E/S.
5Note that this implies that the same firm may be selected as a control for several treatment firms in different
years.
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AMit(orRTMit) = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Treatit + β3Postit+1 ∗ Treatit +
β4Controlsit−1 + vi + qt + εit(4.9)
where Treatit is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in the treatment group and 0
otherwise. The rest of the variables are the same as in the previous test and they are described
in Appendix 1. Our coefficient of interest, β3, captures the difference-in-differences in financial
reporting quality levels of: (Treatment group in post-event period - Treatment group pre-event
adoption period) - (Control group in post-event period - Control group in pre-event period). A
negative and significant β3 would indicate a decrease in the level of earnings management of
treatment firms after the blackout period adoption as compared to the control group.
4.4.5 Cost of capital for insider trading restrictions adopters
Previous studies have documented that earnings management increases the cost of capital for the
company. Aboody et al. (2005), Francis et al. (2005) and Gray et al. (2009) show that firms with
higher levels of accruals earnings management have higher cost of capital. Kim and Sohn (2013)
extends these findings and shows that the market seems to penalize real transactions management
by requiring a higher cost of equity for these manipulations compared to accruals-based earnings
management.
The intuition behind these findings comes from the fact that outside investors require a higher
cost of equity capital for noisier earnings (that is, in the case of high earnings management)
that offer noisy signals regarding the level of expected cash flows. This relation is analytically
demonstrated by Lambert et al. (2007). Based on these arguments, we expect that the reduced
level of total earnings manipulations following the adoption of restricted windows translates into
a lower cost of capital for these firms.
Following Easton (2004), we measure the cost of capital using the following formula:
CoC =
√
EPS2 − EPS1
P0
where EPS2 (EPS1) is the two(one)-periods ahead earnings-per-share, and P0 is the current
price6.
Next, we estimate the following regression for the sample of restriction windows adopters:
CoCit = β0 + β1Postit+1 + β2Controlsit−1 + εit (4.10)
A negative and significant coefficient of Postit+1 would suggest that firms enjoy lower levels of
cost of capital in the quarters following the adoption of blackout-periods.
6Information regarding earnings and prices is collected from Compustat Quarterly.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the initial sample, described in Section
3.1. Panels B and C present the main variables used in this study separately by adopters and
non-adopters of insider trading restrictions. It can be seen that adopters tend to be smaller,
have lower BTM ratios and slightly lower dollar-values of insider trading. From the descriptives,
there are no obvious differences between the levels of earnings manipulations between adopters
and non-adopters.
[Insert Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here]
Table 4.2 presents the levels of our measures of discretionary accruals before and after the event
date for the treatment and control groups, respectively. Consistent with our prediction, for the
control group there are no differences between the level of earnings management before and
after their pseudo-events, while the treatment group has lower mean and median values for
discretionary accruals following the quarter when the trading restrictions became effective.
[Insert Table 4.3 about here]
Table 4.3 presents the results on whether restricted windows successfully limit insiders’ ability
to trade. The dependent variable in the first specification is the net purchase ratio, and in the
second one is the dollar-value of net purchase ratio. The negative and significant coefficient of
the variable Postit+1 in both cases suggests that the extent to which insiders trade significantly
decreases following the adoption of blackout periods.
4.5.2 Results of tests on sample of insider trading restrictions adopters
The first test assesses the way blackout periods affect earnings manipulations before and after
the event date (i.e., before and after trading restrictions become effective). At this step, we
estimate Eq. (4.5) on the set of firms that have adopted restricted trading windows.
We predict a negative and significant coefficient of Postit+1, in line with our hypothesis that
on average there is less earnings management (therefore, improved earnings quality) after the
blackout periods become effective within the firm.
[Insert Table 4.4 about here]
Table 4.4 present the effect of the insider trading restrictions adoption event on positive, negative
and absolute discretionary accruals, respectively. While in the three models the coefficient of
our variable of interest, Postit+1, has the predicted sign, it is significant in the absolute values
model, suggesting that the extent of accruals manipulation decreases after blackout periods are
adopted.
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[Insert Table 4.5 about here]
The first two columns of Table 5 present the results when using the two measures of real earnings
manipulation as dependent variable. As predicted, the coefficient of Postit+1 is negative and
significant. However, for the second measure of real transaction management the coefficient of
the variable of interest is not significant. In the last column, an overall measure of earnings
management is the dependent variables, and the coefficient of interest is negative and significant,
suggesting that the total level of earnings manipulation decreases following the adoption of
firm-level blackout periods.
4.5.3 Results using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
Table 4.6 shows estimation results using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions where the dependent
variables are accruals-based and real earnings management, respectively. The negative and
significant coefficient of Postit+1 is in line with our expectation, suggesting that both types of
earnings manipulations decrease following the adoption of insider trading restrictions.
[Insert Table 4.6 about here]
Overall, the results support the prediction that firms which impose blackout periods are small
growth firms, and that analyst following is positively associated with insider trading restrictions.
4.5.4 Results of test on treatment versus control firms
For this test we use both the set of treatment firms and their matched controls in order to
compare the effect of insider trading restrictions on earnings management on the treatment
group compared to the matched control group, before and after the event. We estimate Eq. (4.8)
on the matched sample of firms. We expect a negative and significant β3, suggesting that after
trading restrictions become effective, there is a decrease in the extent to which firms manipulate
earnings with respect to their non-adopters of insider trading restriction counterparts.
[Insert Table 4.7 about here]
Table 4.7 presents the results of our test. The first three columns present the effect of the insider
trading restrictions adoption event on positive, negative and absolute discretionary accruals,
respectively. The coefficient of our variable of interest, Post x Treat, has the predicted sign in all
of these specifications. In particular, there is a significant decrease (increase) in income-increasing
(decreasing) accruals management levels in the period following blackout period adoption for
treatment firms. The same coefficient has the predicted negative sign for the absolute value of
discretionary accruals, but is not statistically significant. Columns (4) and (5) present the results
of the estimations having real earnings manipulation as dependent variables. As predicted,
the coefficient of Post x Treat is negative and significant in the case of RTM1, while it is not
significant for RTM2. In the last column, the dependent variable is given by the overall measure
of earnings management and the coefficient of interest is negative and significant, consistent
with our prediction.
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Taken together, these results are consistent with insider trading adopters enjoying overall lower
levels of earnings manipulation, both accruals-based and real earnings management, following
the introduction of blackout periods.
4.5.5 Results of test on cost of capital
The results corresponding to the estimation of Eq. (4.10) are presented in Table 4.10. The
negative and significant coefficient of Postit+1 is in line with our prediction that a positive
consequence for firms that successfully restrain their insiders from trading on private information
comes as a result of the positive rewards of the market for low levels of earnings manipulations
in the form of lower cost of equity capital.
[Insert Table 4.8 about here]
4.6 Conclusions and future research
This study examines whether firms that impose restrictions on insider trading enjoy lower levels
of earnings management in subsequent quarters to the adoption of such measures. We develop
our measure of the restriction adoption quarter based on the relative increase in the percentage
of trades performed by insiders in the allowed window compared to previous quarters.
We find that firms have lower levels of discretionary accruals in the quarters following the
adoption of the insider trading restrictions by undertaking a two-steps analysis. First, we find
that on average treatment firms have lower levels of discretionary accruals in the period following
the restriction adoption quarter. Additionally, as a robustness check, we obtain the same result
when we employ a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions approach that allows for the regression errors
to be correlated between two equations where accruals-based and real earnings management,
respectively, are the dependent variables.
Second, to alleviate potential endogeneity issues, we use propensity score matching to create a
matched-pair research design that allows us to compare changes in financial reporting quality
between firms that adopt restrictions and firms that are similar to the treated firms across a set
of relevant observable characteristics, but do not adopt trading restrictions. Results show that
firms that adopt restrictions have lower levels of earnings manipulations than their matched
controls in the post-event period. Taken together, our findings provide evidence consistent with
firms that impose restrictions on insider trading enjoying lower levels of earnings manipulation
after such measures are imposed.
Next, we document one consequence of the lower levels of earnings manipulation that result from
adopting insider trading restrictions. We provide evidence that firms experience lower cost of
capital as a result of the decrease in earnings manipulation following the adoption of firm-level
blackout periods. This finding is consistent with Kim and Sohn (2013), that suggest that the
cost of capital is positively associated with earnings management.
The results presented in this paper provide insights regarding a question left unanswered by
previous studies that documented that a large percentage of the firms in S&P500 voluntarily
adopt insider trading restrictions, despite finding no consistent answer as to why would firms
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engage in such a (costly) behavior. Our findings are consistent with firms enjoying lower levels
of earnings manipulation, both accruals-based and real transaction management, following the
adoption of blackout periods. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that insider
trading opportunities represent an incentive for insiders to negatively influence the quality of
financial statements disclosed by their company.
Nevertheless, we are aware of some potential limitations of this work. Insider trading restrictions
are not directly observable, and therefore we employ an indirect proxy of whether a firm has
such restrictions in place. Previous research that examined blackout periods imposed by firms
have identified that restricted firms allow trading only during a short window following earnings
announcements. We develop our proxy for insider trading restrictions based on guidance provided
by previous work, showing that the most common restriction is for firms to only allow insiders to
trade is one month after earnings announcements. We perform a validity test to check whether
insider trading decreases following the quarter that we identify as the one when restricted trading
windows have been adopted, and results support the use of our measure. However, a more direct
proxy to validate our measure could come from textual analysis of firms’ disclosures about the
exact date when such measures have been adopted.
Also, despite our efforts to alleviate endogeneity concerns by controlling for a series of corporate
governance dimensions or using a difference-in-differences approach on a matched sample, we
cannot completely rule out the possibility that other corporate events may be (partly) responsible
for our result.
Overall, the results presented in this paper are consistent with the idea that earnings manipulation
is partly justified by insider trading incentives. Taken together, our findings provide evidence
that when firms restrain their insiders from trading with the shares of their own company, there
is a reduction in the overall level of earnings management, which could lead to potential benefits
from the company like lower cost of equity capital.
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4.6 Appendix A. Variable definitions
AM : abnormal accruals, computed based on the model described in Equation (1).
|AM|: the absolute value of abnormal accruals (AM ) computed based on the model described
in Equation (1).
ABExp: abnormal discretionary expenses, measured as the deviations from the predicted values
from the year-industry models in Equation (2).
ABProd: abnormal production cost, measured as the deviations from the predicted values from
the year-industry models in Equation (3).
ABCash: abnormal cash flow from operations, measured as the deviations from the predicted
values from the year-industry models in Equation (4).
Analyst: a corporate governance control likely to affect managers’ opportunities to engage in
earnings management. It is measured as the natural log of the number of analysts following the
firm at the end of the previous quarter.
BdIndep: board independence, computed as the number of independent directors divided by
the total number of directors on the board.
Book-to-market: firms book value divided by the market value of common equity at the end
of the fiscal year.
EM : total earnings management, computed as the sum between accruals-based and real earnings
management (AM+RTM1 ).
EventDate is the quarter when the largest increase in PercentageSafe was recorded compared
to the average values of PercentageSafe over the previous quarters. EventDate is our proxy for
the date when the firm has started to apply blackout periods. A firm is considered to restrict
insider trading if during all the quarters following EventDate, PercentageSafe is maintained at a
minimum level of 70% (that is, minimum 70% of all quarterly trades take place in the allowed
trading window). Firms that restrict insider trading according to this definition represent our
treatment group of firms.
InsiderTrading is the ratio of the dollar value of trades made by insiders (buy and sell) to
market equity, at the end of the previous quarter.
Insider trading restrictions: We use the approach of Roulstone (2003) to compute our mea-
sure of insider trading restrictions. Earnings announcement dates are collected from Compustat.
Only trades performed by officer insiders are considered. Bettis et al. (2000) finds via surveys
that firms allow insiders to trade only in the one-month period after earnings announcements.
Following this guidance, a trade is considered to be made during an allowed trading window if it
occurs within the first third (approximately 20 trading days, 30 calendar days) after a quarterly
earnings announcement. For every year, a variable PercentageSafe is calculated as the percentage
of shares traded during this window over the total number of shares traded during the period
between 2 consecutive earnings announcements. In order to identify the quarter when insider
trading restrictions became effective in a firm, we compute the difference between PercentageSafe
and the the average PercentageSafe of all previous quarters for that firm. The date when the
firm has adopted a blackout period is considered the quarter at which this difference is has the
highest value. In order to consider that a firm restricts insider trading, we follow Lee et al.
(2013) who additionally require for PercentageSafe to be higher than a benchmark value in all
subsequent quarters. Therefore, we request for PercentageSafe must maintain a high level of
70% (that is, 70% of the trades made during a quarter are performed in the allowed trading
window) in all periods subsequent to the event quarter.
InstOwn: the percentage shares owned by institutional investors.
Market Equity: the share price at the end of the fiscal year times the number of shares
outstanding.
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Net Purchase Ratio: the net number of shares purchased by all insiders during a quarter
(=#Purchased shares- #Sold shares), scaled by total shares traded during the quarter (=#Pur-
chased shares + #Sold shares ).
Net Purchase Ratio (dollar): the dollar-value of the net number of shares purchased by all
insiders during a quarter (=#Purchased shares x Dollar value of purchased shares- #Sold shares
x Dollar value of sold shares), scaled by total dollar-value of the shares traded during the quarter
(=#Purchased shares x Dollar value of purchased shares+ #Sold shares x Dollar value of sold
shares).
PercentageSafe measures the ratio of the number of trades made by the insiders of a firm in
the first third of a quarter to the number of trades made by the insiders of a firm over the entire
quarter.
Post: an indicator variable for whether the observation is after an executive transition; it takes
the value 1 in the quarters following the event, 0 before the event and a missing value in the
event quarter.
ROA: income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.
RTM1 : the first measure of the total amount of real transaction management, computed as
(-1)x ABExp + (-1) x ABCash.
RTM2 : the second measure of the total amount of real transaction management, computed as
(-1)x ABExp + ABProd.
Size: the logarithm of market equity.
Z-Score: Altman’s Z-Score.
Z-Score_d: decile of Altman’s Z-Score.
NOA: net operating assets, computed as shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities
plus total debt.
NOA_d: 1 if the net operating assets at the beginning of the year is above the median of the
industry-year, and zero otherwise.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics - ITR Adopters and Non-ITR adopters
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
AM 9519 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01
|AM | 9519 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
RTM1 9519 -0.22 0.76 -0.17 -0.01 0.05
RTM2 9519 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04
EM1 9519 -0.22 0.76 -0.17 -0.01 0.05
PctSafe 9519 0.61 0.37 0.30 0.67 1.00
Size 9519 8.32 1.52 7.17 8.15 9.36
BTM 9519 0.42 0.26 0.25 0.37 0.55
ROA 9519 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Analyst 9519 2.44 0.62 2.08 2.48 2.89
Insider Trading 9519 2.31 13.36 0.12 0.51 1.73
NOA 9519 2.89 2.40 1.40 2.32 3.57
InstOwn 9519 2.26 12.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
BoardIndep 9519 0.76 0.13 0.69 0.78 0.88
Z-Score 9519 0.53 15.21 0.00 0.00 0.01
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper. See Appendix A for
the definitions of the variables.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: ITR Adopters
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
AM 442 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02
|AM | 442 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
RTM1 442 -0.15 0.66 -0.05 -0.00 0.02
RTM2 442 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.05
EM1 442 -0.15 0.66 -0.05 -0.00 0.02
PctSafe 442 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.90 1.00
Size 442 7.84 1.35 6.96 7.87 8.59
BTM 442 0.38 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.49
ROA 442 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Analyst 442 2.26 0.59 1.79 2.30 2.77
Insider Trading 442 2.17 4.72 0.17 0.69 2.53
NOA 442 2.72 2.01 1.36 2.28 3.46
InstOwn 442 2.96 14.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
BoardIndep 442 0.77 0.13 0.67 0.80 0.88
Z-Score 442 5.30 63.44 0.00 0.01 0.01
Panel B. Non-ITR Adopters
N Mean SD P25 Median P75
AM 9077 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01
|AM | 9077 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
RTM1 9077 -0.22 0.76 -0.18 -0.01 0.05
RTM2 9077 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04
EM1 9077 -0.22 0.76 -0.18 -0.01 0.05
PctSafe 9077 0.61 0.37 0.30 0.67 1.00
Size 9077 8.34 1.52 7.20 8.18 9.41
BTM 9077 0.43 0.26 0.25 0.37 0.55
ROA 9077 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Analyst 9077 2.45 0.62 2.08 2.56 2.89
Insider Trading 9077 2.32 13.64 0.11 0.51 1.69
NOA 9077 2.90 2.41 1.40 2.33 3.57
InstOwn 9077 2.23 12.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
BoardIndep 9077 0.76 0.13 0.70 0.78 0.88
Z-Score 9077 0.29 6.78 0.00 0.00 0.01
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper. See Appendix A for
the definitions of the variables.
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Table 4.3: ITR effectiveness in limiting insider trading
Net Purchase Ratio Net Purchase Ratio (dollar)
Post -0.217** -0.219**
(-2.30) (-2.32)
Size -0.196*** -0.197***
(-3.07) (-3.08)
BTM -0.121 -0.126*
(-0.77) (-0.80)
ROA -2.071* -2.102*
(-1.73) (-1.76)
Constant 1.181* 1.197*
(1.72) (1.74)
Firm indicator Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes
R2 0.417 0.416
N 1180 1180
This table reports results based on Eq. (4.5). The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on
White standard errors. All variables are winsorized yearly at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.4: ITR Adopters - Accruals earnings management
AM > 0 AM < 0 |AM |
Post -0.012 0.013 -0.011*
(-0.95) (1.27) (-1.73)
Size -0.014 0.006 -0.005
(-1.23) (0.68) (-0.88)
BTM -0.006 -0.006 -0.000
(-0.25) (-0.19) (-0.02)
ROA 0.122 -0.080 0.144**
(1.02) (-0.43) (2.18)
NOA_d -0.010 0.013* -0.009**
(-1.24) (1.91) (-2.04)
InstOwn -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.96) (-0.40) (-0.98)
BoardIndep 0.003 0.020 0.001
(0.10) (0.56) (0.07)
Analyst 0.006 0.014 -0.005
(0.51) (1.61) (-1.11)
Z-Score_d -0.003 0.002 -0.003**
(-1.16) (1.01) (-2.43)
RTM1 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(-0.94) (0.66) (-1.48)
Constant 0.287** -0.100 0.148**
(2.08) (-0.05) (2.15)
Firm indicator Yes Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.654 0.803 0.595
N 220 199 419
This table presents regression results on how adoption blackout periods affects firm’s earnings
manipulation, as reflected in Eq. (4.6). See Appendix A for the definition of all the variables. The
numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are winsorized
yearly at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level level
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Table 4.5: ITR Adopters - Real transactions management and Total earnings management
RTM1 RTM2 EM
Post -0.192** -0.000 -0.277**
(-2.57) (-0.04) (-2.55)
Size -0.016 0.018** 0.001
(-0.51) (2.01) (0.02)
BTM -0.200** -0.025 -0.322***
(-2.12) (-0.87) (-2.74)
ROA -1.393** -0.288 -0.997
(-2.12) (-2.62) (-1.14)
NOA_d -0.146*** 0.013 -0.179***
(-3.06) 2.07 (-3.05)
InstOwn 0.002 0.000 0.001
(1.53) (0.22) (0.29)
BoardIndep -0.260* 0.008 -0.309
(-1.65) (0.23) (-1.44)
Analyst 0.034 0.008 0.040
(1.01) (1.10) (0.88)
Z-Score_d -0.025** -0.006*** -0.047**
(-2.18) (-3.34) (-2.31)
|AM | 0.664 0.111
(1.25) (0.88)
Constant 0.970*** 0.899*** 1.005***
(2.89) (-1.28) (2.69)
Firm indicator Yes Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.922 0.776 0.914
N 478 418 418
This table presents regression results on how adoption blackout periods affects firm’s earnings
manipulation, as reflected in Eq. (4.6). See Appendix A for the definition of all the variables. The
numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are winsorized
yearly at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level level
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Table 4.6: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
|AM | RTM1
Post -0.013*** -0.200***
(-2.61) (-3.69)
Size -0.007 0.019
(-1.60) (0.38)
BTM 0.009 -0.279**
(0.77) (-2.23)
ROA 0.162** -1.429*
(2.32) (-1.82)
NOA_d -0.008** -0.167***
(-2.24) (-4.12)
InstOwn 0.000 -0.001
(0.17) (-0.10)
BoardIndep -0.029 -0.211
(-1.58) (-1.02)
Analyst -0.009* 0.023
(-1.79) (0.38)
Z-Score_d -0.002* -0.045***
(-1.93) (-4.40)
RTM1 -0.006
(-1.29)
|AM | 0.401
(0.69)
Constant 0.000 -0.058
(.) (-0.08)
Firm indicator Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes
R2 0.509
N 356
This table reports results based on SUR estimation. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on
White standard errors. All variables are winsorized yearly at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.7: ITR Adopters vs. Non-ITR Adopters
AM > 0 AM < 0 |AM | RTM1 RTM2 EM
Post 0.008*** 0.002 -0.003 0.020 -0.004 0.059**
(3.64) (0.60) (-0.98) (0.92) (-0.79) (2.33)
Treat -0.007** 0.010*** -0.016*** 0.038 -0.044*** 0.050
(-2.33) (3.56) (-5.77) (1.47) (-9.31) (1.65)
Post x Treat -0.007* 0.011* -0.002 -0.168** 0.008 -0.437***
(-1.83) (1.95) (-0.63) (-2.54) (0.89) (-4.35)
Size -0.005*** 0.012*** -0.010*** -0.284*** 0.017*** -0.355***
(-5.14) (5.78) (-6.61) (-17.65) (10.02) (-15.68)
ROA -0.229*** -0.163*** 0.024 1.839*** 0.572*** 2.577***
(-5.67) (-2.94) (0.64) (5.15) (5.80) (6.29)
BTM -0.014*** 0.042*** -0.031*** 0.018 0.008 -0.008
(-4.29) (6.98) (-8.83) (0.46) (1.15) (-0.19)
Analyst -0.010*** -0.004 -0.003 0.231*** -0.023*** 0.328***
(-4.59) (-0.93) (-1.06) (9.63) (-3.86) (10.89)
RTM1 -0.010*** 0.017*** -0.016***
(-5.96) (5.49) (-9.34)
|AM | -2.141*** -0.448***
(-7.83) (-3.88)
Constant 0.075*** -0.153*** 0.121*** 1.708*** -0.076*** 1.904***
(8.47) (-6.53) (14.29) (10.69) (-4.52) (11.98)
Industry indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.615 0.366 0.390 0.607 0.351 0.521
N 656 633 1289 1289 1289 1675
This table reports results based on a difference-in-differences approach as reflected in Eq. (4.6), for which we used a sample of matched treatment and controls
firms identified using propensity score matching. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are winsorized yearly
at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Cost of Capital for ITR Adopters
(1) (2)
Post -0.020*** -0.014**
(-3.33) (-2.01)
Size -0.004
(-0.84)
BTM -0.060
(1.51)
ROA -0.050
(-0.17)
Constant 0.075*** 0.072*
(20.25) (1.49)
R2 0.005 0.053
N 686 406
This table reports results based on Eq. (4.10). The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on
White standard errors. All variables are winsorized yearly at 1% level.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Price Discovery for Connected
Boards
5.1 Introduction
In this paper, we seek to identify channels of confidential information flows to institutional
investors that could have an impact on the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We focus
on a setting where the board of a listed firm is connected to an institutional investor through
a common board member. A comprehensive database on board social network connections
allows us to develop a measure of board connectedness that counts the number of connections
that a company has to institutional investors. In order to capture the timeliness of price
discovery, we compute a measure of how quickly information is impounded into price around
earnings announcements. We provide preliminary evidence the higher the number of connections
to institutional investors a company is, the more timely the price discovery over quarterly
earnings circles is. This result is consistent with the idea that the more institutional investors
are connected to the board of the firm, the more pervasive their insider trading becomes in
influencing the speed of price discovery during earnings cycles.
A vast literature in accounting and finance has examined channels through which information is
impounded into prices. This literature documents that securities prices incorporate information
from different sources, like accounting reports, financial analysts, firm’s own disclosures, or
insider trading, to name a few.1 In this paper, we aim to study a type of indirect insider trading
that has received considerably less attention both from regulators and from the specialized
literature, given that it is considerably more difficult to track back: we present preliminary
results consistent with the idea that the more institutional investors connections a firm has, the
faster the information related to earnings announcements is impounded into its stock price.
As researchers, we are not able to directly observe the flows of private information to institutional
investors. In order to overcome this challenge, we study instances where a listed firm and an
institutional investor share a common board member. We posit that this type of connection
may facilitate the flow of material private information from a listed firm to entities able to trade
on such information, like institutional investors. We interpret a relatively fast price discovery
as reflecting an early dissemination of private information to institutional investors, and vice
versa. Based on this idea, we predict and provide preliminary evidence that the more board
connections a firm shares with institutional investors, the faster the price discovery process is.
We also acknowledge that there are potential alternative causal interpretations of the positive
association between board connectedness to institutional investors and the speed of price discovery
for the firm. One possibility is that our measures of board connectedness are correlated with
some unobserved or omitted firm characteristic that is associated with price discovery. For
1Some examples include Ball and Brown (1968), Ball and Kothari (1991), Healy and Palepu (2001).
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example, well-connected board members may prefer to sit on the boards of firms with more
analyst following.
Our analysis extends and complements a recent body of research that investigates novel, disguised
types of insider trading by informed institutions. Cohen et al. (2007) documents that portfolio
managers place larger bets on connected firms and perform significantly better on these holdings
relative to other holdings. Bushman et al. (2010) finds that insider trading by institutional
lenders is sufficiently pervasive to significantly influence the speed of stock price discovery during
regular earnings cycles. However, while most of these studies focus on the outcome of having
access to private information form the perspective of the receiver of this information, we are
interested in studying the consequences of being connected to institutional investors for the firm
itself.
This paper also contributes to the research regarding the relation between earnings and returns
by providing empirical evidence that stock prices anticipate earnings information the higher the
number of connections that the firm shares with institutional investors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the related literature,
Section 3 discusses data and measurement choices, Sections 4 and 5 present the research design
and results, and Section 6 concludes and presents directions for future research.
5.2 Related literature
Our work connects three main strands of research: a growing literature on the role of board
connections in the transfer of relevant corporate information, the body of work analyzing indirect
forms of insider trading, and the literature on determinants of timely price discovery.
The strand of the role of board connections literature most connected to our study is the body of
work exploring different dimensions of the economic impact of shared board directorates for the
firm. These studies propose that networks built by shared board directorates represent channels
through which information is communicated and resources are exchanged for the connected
organizations. However, there is no clear theoretical prediction of the consequences of being
well-connected for the firm. Some potential benefits of well-connected boards could be: (1) better
access to information about industry trends or market conditions; (2) a comparative advantage
in making strategic decisions; or (3) access to a mechanism of value-enhancing innovations
transmission (Larcker et al. (2013)).
Being a well-connected board could also adversely affect the firm. For example, the boardroom
networks could promote value-decreasing practices, like options backdating (Bizjak et al. (2009)).
Another possibility is that members who hold board positions in multiple companies exert
less intensive monitoring on each of the companies (Core et al. (1999)). Larcker et al. (2013)
takes a first step in resolving this ambiguity and studies the net economic effect of board’s
well-connectedness; the main take-away from the study is that well-connectedness is associated
with better firm performance. We extend these findings by building a measure of board well-
connectedness with institutional investors, and analyze the impact of this basic centrality measure
on the price discovery process around quarterly earnings announcements.
Insider trading has long received increased attention both from research and regulators in the last
decades. Because of the potential to undermine investor confidence in the integrity of the security
markets, regulators have enforced insiders to publicly disclose their trades within maximum two
days from their trading. Interestingly, regulators have been increasingly concerned with insider
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trading violations beyond the typical situation where insiders themselves trade based on private
information about the prospects of their company. In the U.S., the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2 deals with
the misappropriation of information based on non-business relationships; that is, the disclosure
of material private information to anybody else who can take advantage of such opportunities
also falls under the illegal insider trading umbrella.
In the recent years, the finance literature has increasingly focused on potential channels of
information flow that could facilitate such indirect insider trading opportunities. Mehta and
Reeb (2014) analyze the so-called “shadow trading”, representing situations where insiders of a
firm enjoy potential opportunities to profitably trade or disseminate private information about
their business partners or competitors (target firms). Their evidence indicates that target firms
experience a significant increase in symptoms of informed trading activity prior to the release of
private information by a business partner or competitor.
In the loan syndicate literature, Bushman et al. (2010) provides compelling evidence that
institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading
in the equity market. Similarly, Ivashina and Sun (2011) directly examine the stock trading
patterns of specific institutional investors that also hold syndicated loans in their portfolio at the
time of loan renegotiations. They document that institutional managers who participate in loan
renegotiations trade in the same company’s stock after the loan renegotiation and outperform
other managers.
As for the price discovery literature, Butler et al. (2007) finds that financial reporting frequency
affects the speed with which accounting information is reflected in security prices. Twedt (2016)
analyzes the role of dissemination of guidance news in the price discovery process following
the announcement of management earnings guidance. Brogaard et al. (2014) documents that
high-frequency traders facilitate price efficiency by trading in the direction of permanent changes.
Boehmer and Wu (2013) shows that short sellers play an important role in the price discovery
process, as prices are more accurate when short sellers are more active.
A closely related paper to ours is Cohen et al. (2010), that documents that mutual funds that
are connected to listed firms via educational links place larger bets and obtain larger profits
based on trades in these firms. While their main focus is on the way that connected mutual
funds trade, our approach is closer to that of Larcker et al. (2013) in studying the effects of
being connected for the firm itself : when the firm is well-connected, the price is more efficient
around earnings announcements. This preliminary result is consistent with the fact that the
more institutional investors are connected to the board of the firm, the more pervasive their
insider trading becomes in influencing the speed of price discovery during earnings cycles.
5.3 Data and measurement
5.3.1 Data sources and sample selection
We gather data from the following sources. We collect information about boards’ networks
from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited, a private research company specialized in
social network data on company officials of US public and private companies. The data provides
relational links between boards of directors based on the board members they share with other
associations, as well as the period over which each connection has been shared.
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We gather institutional investors from the SEC’s EDGAR database by scanning 13-F filers.
Under Securities Exchange Act Section 3(a)(9) and Section 13(f)(5)(A), an institutional investor
is an entity that either invests in, or buys and sells, securities for its own account; or a natural
person or an entity that exercises investment discretion over the account of any other natural
person or entity. Currently, only managers with over $100 million under their control are required
to file, but others they may also do so voluntarily. EDGAR provides the name and the CIK
identifier for all institutional investors in their records; however, BoardEx only reports a CIK
identifier for listed companies, therefore for insuring the reliability of our match between the
data in EDGAR and BoardEx, we resume our sample to those institutional investors that are
public and can be matched by CIK code2.
We obtain earnings announcement dates, firm characteristics and stock data from Compustat
Quarterly and CRSP. We match the observations in BoardEx and EDGAR 13-F filers with
Compustat and CRSP, and additionally require each firm to have a minimum number of two
connections to institutional investors between 2000-2014. The final sample consists of 227
firm-quarter observations with complete data.
5.3.2 Construction of board centrality measure
Using BoardEx, we construct an undirected and unweighted measure of board centrality that
counts shared directorates between a firm and an institutional investor. Shared directorates are
defined as two organizations (a public firm and an institutional investor) that share at least one
board member.
BoardEx offers information about the composition of the committees of firms, including the role
each individual holds within the committees and the starting and end date of their appointment.
We compute a degree centrality measure of the board to institutional investors as the sum of the
number of connections that the board of directors has through all of its members to firms that
are identified in EDGAR as being a 13-F filer: NConnections.
5.3.3 Estimating the timeliness of price discovery
The concept of “timeliness” can be conceptualized in two distinct ways: intraperiod and long-
horizon timeliness (Butler et al. (2007)). The first of them, intraperiod timeliness (IPT), reflects
the speed with which earnings information is impounded into prices over a given period. This
concept is more closely related to the metric of Ball and Brown (1968). The long-horizon timeliness
measures how much of the period’s earnings explain, or are explained, by contemporaneous
returns (Beaver et al. (1980); Beaver et al. (1997)).
Our understanding of the price discovery concept is in line with the first of these two approaches,
given that we are interested in the speed of earnings-based price formation over quarterly earnings
cycles. Like Ball and Brown (1968), Bushman et al. (2010) and Butler et al. (2007), we focus
on the timeliness of price discovery with respect to accounting earnings information. In this
sense, we compute an individual intraperiod timeliness metric for each firm-quarter (IPT ). This
measure captures the speed of earnings-based price formation during the days (-60, +2) around
2In order to increase our sample, we intend to manually match the two databases by the institutional investor’s
name in the following versions of the paper.
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Figure 5.1: Example of IPT computation
earnings announcements dates. Specifically, we compute a metric similar to Beekes and Brown
(2007) and measure timeliness as the average absolute difference between the log of the price
in day m=-60 and the log of the price in day m=2 around the earnings announcement date
(m=0):
IPT =
2∑
m=−60
|ln(Pm)− ln(P2)|
63 (5.1)
As it can be noticed, this measure of firm-level IPT does not use information about the individual
firm’s earnings; instead, earnings information will indirectly affect prices. Following this definition,
the lower the value of IPT, the less time it takes to discover price, or the more timely the price
discovery process is.
To illustrate the intuition behind our measure of timeliness, assume we have two stocks, A and
B3. In the case of stock A, assume the price evolves from 10 to 20 by the end of day -60, and it
maintains the same value until the last day of our earnings cycle, day 2 (the solid line in Figure
1 ). Therefore, no value-relevant information was disclosed after the first of the 63 days in our
earnings cycle.
For stock B, assume the price is 10 throughout the entire earnings cycle, and it reaches the value
20 only in the last day of our cycle, day m=2 (the dashed line in Figure 5.1 ). In this case, all
value-relevant information was previously unavailable and is only discovered after the earnings
announcement date. Based on the formula (5.1), IPTA has a lower value than IPTB, and stock
A is more timely than B in its price discovery process.
3Example and figure similar to those in Beekes and Brown (2007).
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5.3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the connected firms in our sample by year. As it can be
seen, as much as 28 observations are in 2001, when the minimum number of connections was 2
and the maximum 14 with an average of 4.04 connections per firm.
[Insert Table 5.1 about here]
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the characteristics of the firm-quarters in our sample. The observations
in the below median value of connectedness have a higher mean and median of IPT than those
above median; this is consistent with our expectation that the more connections a firm shares
with institutional investors, the more timely its price discovery process is. Observations in the
above-median group seem to be slightly larger, have lower book-to-market values and lower
profitability than those below the median.
[Insert Tables 5.2 and 5.3 about here]
The correlation matrix in Table 5.4 shows that the intraperiod timeliness measure and the
centrality measure are negatively correlated, consistent with our prediction. IPT is negatively
correlated with size (consistent with Beekes et al. (2007)) and profitability, and positively related
with book-to-market.
[Insert Table 5.4 about here]
5.4 Empirical analysis
In order to test our hypothesis, we estimate the following regression:
IPTit = β0 + β1NConnectionsit + β2Controlsit + ε (5.2)
The coefficient of interest is β1, which we predict to be negative and significant. Note that price
discovery is more timely the lower the IPT value is. The controls we include in our specification
are size, book-to-market and ROA. All variables are presented in Appendix A.
5.5 Results
Table 5.5 reports regression results for the timeliness model estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares.
[Insert Table 5.5 about here]
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Model (1) presents OLS results without controls, while Models (2)-(4) include controls. In all
specifications, industry and quarter indicators are included. White-adjusted standard errors are
reported to control for heteroskedasticity. As predicted, the higher the number of connections
with institutional investors, the more timely the price discovery process is, as it is reflected
by the negative and significant coefficient β1. Note that when value-relevant information is
impounded into shares prices on a more timely manner, the IPT metric is closer to zero.
5.6 Conclusion and future developments of the paper
In this paper we provide preliminary evidence of the association between the number of shared
directorates between a firm and institutional investors and the speed of price discovery for the
firm. Documenting this relation represents the first step in identifying a channel through which
confidential information flows from firms to institutional investors.
In order to test our main hypothesis, we use a sample of firms connected to institutional investors
and regress the intraperiod timeliness against a measure of board centrality. Our result is robust
to the inclusion of industry and quarter indicators, as well as of a series of controls. Results
of this analysis are consistent with our main hypothesis, indicating that more central boards
have more timely price discovery processes during earnings cycles. However, in order to rule
out alternative explanations that could be consistent with our findings, there are few potential
developments for this paper.
First, at this point we only include in our analysis firms connected to publicly listed institutional
investors, as they are the only ones BoardEx provides a CIK code for. We can obtain a broader
sample by manually matching by name institutional investors in BoardEx with institutional
investors that are listed as 13-F filers in EDGAR.
Importantly, we see the result presented in this paper as preliminary evidence of a broader, more
insightful network study of the effect that information flows has on the speed of price discovery.
Specifically, it would be interesting to track information flow that might affect price discovery in
the case of business partners or competitors in future versions of this work.
Second, it would be useful to study potential intraperiod timeliness differences between a sample
of firms connected to institutional investors (treatment group) and a sample of firms connected
to other institutions according to BoardEx. This setting build on the premise that firms well-
connected to other organizations (like, for example, charity organizations) do not have similar
price discovery levels as those well-connected to institutional investors; this difference would
come as a result of institutional investors’ higher likelihood to trade on private information than
other organizations.
Third, deriving a portfolio-level intraperiod timeliness measure would be extremely insightful.
As Bushman et al. (2010) specifies, employing a portfolio-level analysis would average away the
random news arrivals that make firm-period measures in regression analysis extremely noisy. For
example, similar to Bushman et al. (2010), we can measure IPT for a portfolio of firm-quarter
observations as a curve that plots, for each day during the 63-days earnings cycle, the cumulative
buy-and-hold abnormal portfolio return up to that day, scaled by the cumulative buy-and-hold
abnormal return for the entire cycle. We would compute this measure for the portfolio comprised
of the firm-quarter observations corresponding to the firms that are less connected to institutional
investors, and for the portfolio of the most connected firm-quarters. Finally, comparing these
the IPT measure for the two portfolio would provide compelling evidence supporting our main
hypothesis.
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Finally, information can flow in predictable ways throughout a network. Up to this point, we
employ only a degree centrality measure for the size of connections between firms and institutional
investors, where a firm and an institutional investor have a common board member. However,
this approach could be extended to other centrality measures that capture the way in which a
public firm can be connected to an institutional investor. For example, the closeness centrality
represents how easily a board can reach another board through interlocking directorates; or
betweenness centrality, capturing the importance of a board in connecting other board with each
other (Larcker et al. (2013)).
Overall, the results presented by this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that being better
connected to institutional investors allows for faster price discovery process. This finding is in
line with the recent interest in the finance and accounting literature regarding the role played
by networks as channels of private information transfer; while in order to rule out alternative
explanations, additional tests must be performed, this framework provides a rich setting for
examining what are the consequences of being well-connected with institutions able to trade on
private information about the firm.
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5.6 Appendix A. Variable definitions
Book-to-market: firms book value divided by the market value of common equity at the end
of the fiscal year.
NConnections: the number of connections of a firm to institutional investors through shared
directorates. In order for a firm to be connected to an institutional investor, they have to share
minimum a board member.
Market Equity: the share price at the end of the fiscal year times the number of shares
outstanding.
ROA: income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets.
Size: the logarithm of market equity.
IPT (intraperiod timeliness): the timeliness of price discovery with respect to accounting
earnings information. In we compute a firm-level intraperiod timeliness metric for each firm-
quarter (IPT ). This measure captures the speed of earnings-based price formation during the
days (-60, +2) around earnings announcements dates. Specifically, we compute a metric similar
to Beekes and Brown (2007) and measure timeliness as the average absolute difference between
the log of the price in day m=-60 and the log of the price in day m=2 around the earnings
announcement date (m=0):
IPT =
2∑
m=−60
|ln(Pm)− ln(P2)|
63 (5.3)
Following this definition, the lower the value of IPT, the less time it takes to discover price, or
the more timely the price discovery process is.
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5.6 Tables
Table 5.1: Distribution of connected firms by year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N 19 28 15 18 15 24 22 14
Mean 4.84 4.04 5.33 3.89 2.93 4.04 3.95 5.93
Min 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Max 30 14 14 11 10 11 9 19
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
N 10 10 15 14 12 11 1 228
Mean 4.10 4.10 4.33 4.93 3.83 3.18 2
Min 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Max 11 13 13 22 8 5 2
This table presents the distribution of the connected firms in our sample by year. For example, 19 of our
observations are distributed in 2000; the minimum number of connections of a firm with an institutional
investor was 2, the maximum was 30, and the mean 4.84 connections per firm.
Table 5.2: Descriptives of firm-quarters
N Mean SD Median Min Max
IPT 227 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.78
NConnections 228 4.23 3.53 3.00 2.00 30
Size 228 6.09 2.31 6.15 0.25 13.51
BTM 227 0.68 1.08 0.49 -3.82 13.73
ROA 228 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.53 1.70
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in this paper. See Appendix A for the
definitions of the variables.
Table 5.3: Characteristics of firm-quarters above and below median values of NConnected
Panel A. Firm-quarters below median of connectedness measure
N Mean SD Median Min Max
IPT 131 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.78
NConnections 132 2.33 0.47 2 2 3
Size 132 5.94 2.24 5.89 0.25 13.51
BTM 131 0.73 1.27 0.49 -0.24 13.73
ROA 132 0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.53 1.70
Panel B. Firm-quarters above median of connectedness measure
N Mean SD Median Min Max
IPT 96 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.72
NConnections 96 6.84 4.19 6.00 4.00 30
Size 96 6.29 2.40 6.36 1.45 13.09
BTM 96 0.61 0.77 0.49 -3.82 4.29
ROA 96 -0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.45 0.09
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this paper. See Appendix A for
the definitions of the variables.
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix
IPT NConnections Size BTM ROA
IPT 1
NConnections -0.0681 1
Size -0.2972 0.0634 1
BTM 0.1337 -0.1208 -0.0660 1
ROA -0.0381 -0.0607 0.0905 -0.0250 1
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in this paper. See Appendix A for the
definitions of the variables.
Table 5.5: OLS results. Dependent variable: IPT (intraperiod timeliness)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NConnections -0.0065*** -0.0053** -0.0048* -0.0049*
(-2.75) (-2.08) (-1.83) (-1.82)
Size -0.0131** -0.0135** -0.0138**
(-2.42) (-2.60) (-2.60)
BTM 0.0490** 0.0490**
(2.15) (2.14)
ROA 0.0324
(0.54)
Constant 0.2322* 0.2609** 0.2415* 0.2431*
(1.86) (1.99) (1.87) (1.87)
R2 0.4115 0.4427 0.4603 0.4608
N 227 221 220 220
Industry indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table presents regression results based on the following model:
IPTit = β0 + β1NConnectionsit + β2Controlsit + ε ). See Appendix A for the definition of all the
variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics based on White standard errors. All variables are
winsorized yearly at 0.5% level.
*,**, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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